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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters on the economics of judicial decisionmaking. In chapter 2, , using the data from U.S. immigration courts and the Global Terrorism Dataset, I investigate the effect of terrorist attacks on asylum decisions. I find that
terrorist attacks within the courts’ states reduce the likelihood of granting asylums by 1.9
percent. This effect is driven by Islamic, Right-wing, and Lone-wolf terrorist attacks, and
the magnitude of the effect is largest in the case of Islamic terrorist attacks (3.6 %) and
smallest in case of Lone-wolf attacks (1.9 %). Left-wing terrorist attacks have no impact
on asylum decisions. Applicants from Latin America and China are the groups bearing
the burden of the effects, and there is no evidence indicating that applicants from Muslim
majority countries are adversely affected. Analyzing the news coverage of incidents reveals
a spill-over of effects on all immigration judges in the U.S. when national news channels
cover the incidents. On the other hand, incidents covered by national news do not have a
differential impact on the judges within the state of terrorist attacks, which suggests that
information dissemination is the channel for spill-overs.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of the appellate board’s error correction on asylum
decisions by focusing on instances in which the board remands a case back to the judges (for
a new round of hearings) due to an erroneous decision in the first round. Using the dates that
judges have hearings for cases with error corrections and the date they render a decision for
other cases, I show that having hearings for cases remanded in favor of prosecutors (DHS’s
attorney) reduced the judges’ leniency towards immigrants by 2.8 percent. To understand
the underlying channel through which the asylum decisions are affected, I focus on the appeal
rates of the losing party. This analysis reveals that granted (rejected) asylum applications
x

that are decided during exposure to error corrections are 25 % (3.5 %) less likely to be
appealed by prosecutors (immigrants), which suggest that increased accuracy in the decisions
is a potential mechanism through which receiving error corrections affect asylum decisions.

xi

Chapter 1. Introduction
This dissertation consists of two essays on the intersection of economics and judicial
decision-making. Chapter 2 investigates the causal impact of terrorist attacks on asylum
decisions made by immigration judges in the U.S. Chapter 3 examines the impact of error
corrections by appeal boards on immigration judges’ asylum decisions. Chapter 4 summarizes the findings and present concluding remarks.
1.1. Terrorist Attacks and Asylum Decisions of the Judges
Since the 9/11 attack, a growing body of literature has focused on the intersection
of terrorist attacks, immigration, and attitudes towards immigrants in the host countries.
For instance, by analyzing the period between 1980 and 2004, an increase in immigration in
Western Europe has been linked to an increase in Right-wing terrorism in the hosting countries, with no evidence of immigration impacting non-right-wing terrorism (McAlexander,
2019). Moreover, analysis of the European countries during the post 9/11 period has shown
that news about domestic terrorist attacks, instances in which there is no link between the
perpetrators and immigrants, triggers negative sentiments towards immigrants. In addition,
the impact of terrorism on migration concerns is robust even when the domestic terrorist
attacks are happening in neighboring countries (Böhmelt, Bove, & Nussio, 2020).
Despite these strands of evidence, there is a gap in understanding the impact of
domestic and transnational terrorist attacks in settings that directly affect immigrants, such
as immigration courts. This comes with the fact that terrorist attacks are not isolated events,
and there have been more than 440 terrorism incidents in the U.S. between 2004 and 2019.1
It is unclear whether these attacks affect the asylum decisions of judges, and the existing
1

Author’s calculation from the Global Terrorism Data.
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evidence on the impact of terrorist attacks on asylum decisions in the U.S relies solely on
the 9/11 terrorist attack (Brodeur & Wright, 2019). In Chapter 2, I investigate the impact
of terrorist attacks on asylum decisions of U.S. immigration judges during the post 9/11
period. I highlight the institutional changes in the U.S. immigration system enacted due
to the 9/11 attack and how the changes in enforcement and adjudication functions impose
an identification challenge for studies based on the 9/11 attack. As a result, the sample of
asylum decisions used in the study reported in Chapter 2 is based on the period after the
passage of Homeland Security Act to isolate the effect of institutional changes resulting from
the 9/11 attack.
I find that between 2004 and 2019, asylum applications adjudicated during the sixty
days after a terrorist attack in the courts’ states have a 1.9 percent lower likelihood of being
granted. Unlike the evidence from the 9/11 incident, there is no evidence suggesting that
applicants from Muslim majority countries are adversely affected by terrorist attacks, and
reduction in asylum grants to Latin American and Chinese applicants drive the effects. I
decompose the effect of terrorist attacks by the type of perpetrators into Islamic, Right-wing,
Left-wing, and Unknown categories. Analysis of the decomposed variable show that with
the exception of Left-wing terrorist attacks, all incidents reduce the likelihood of granting
asylum. The magnitude of the effects is largest in case of Islamic terrorist attacks, and judges
are 3.6 % less likely to grant asylum after such incidents. This suggest that asylum decision
are impacted by both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. The study contributes to
the existing literature by complementing immigration courts and terrorist attacks data with
hand-collected data on the national news coverage of incidents. I show that national-news
coverage of terrorist attacks results in the spill-over of the effects to immigration judges who
2

resides in the states that are not attacked directly. I provide suggestive evidence that the
spill-over in the effects is more likely to be due to information dissemination rather than a
differential impact of the incidents that are selected into news coverage.
1.2. Error Corrections in Immigration Courts
Since the Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag (2007) highlighted the significant
discrepancies in grant rates among individual immigration judges, there has been growing
attention to the role of judge tendencies and the problem of inconsistency in asylum decisions
(Keith, Holmes, & Miller, 2013a). Journalists have gathered accounts of family members who
flew their countries facing the same danger yet receiving different outcomes once assigned to
different judges within the same court (Morrissey & Schroeder, 2022). The existing literature
documents that the discrepancies remain significant even after considering factors such as
the humanitarian crisis in the asylee sending countries, U.S. relation with the asylee sending
countries, detention status of the applicant, whether the applicant is represented by a lawyer,
charges brought against the asylum seeker, the employment background of the immigration
judge, and the court at which the case is decided (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007; Miller, Keith,
& Holmes”, 2015).
The documented discrepancies have resulted in a wide range of ad-hoc policy proposals to reduce inconsistencies, such as increasing the number of immigration judges, providing
cultural sensitivity and awareness training, holding immigration judges accountable through
disciplinary actions, and making it a norm, rather than an exception, for the Board of
Immigration Appeal (BIA) to publish opinions (Vaala, 2008). In line with the last policy
proposal, Chapter 3 is concerned with the impact of the appeal board’s opinion on the
immigration judges’ decisions. I review the literature and point out that the previous ev3

idence shows that appellate courts, by setting precedents, can increase the consistency of
adjudications within the lower courts (Chen, Frankenreiter, & Yeh, 2017; Klein & Hume,
2003). However, the BIA rarely publishes its opinion, and 99.9 % of its decisions are made
without being published. The lack of published decisions leaves many immigration judges,
immigration lawyers, and government attorneys with little information about the board’s
preferences and legal philosophy and potentially contributes to the documented discrepancies among judges. Furthermore, it imposes an empirical challenge in estimating the effect
of the board’s opinion on immigration judges and calculating the benefit of publishing more
decisions.
To overcome this challenge, I exploit an institutional feature in which the appellate
board, rather than reversing a decision upon finding errors, issues an opinion and remand the
case to immigration courts for a new round of hearings, resulting in variations in access to
the board’s opinions among immigration judges. I find that, on average, hearing a case that
is remanded in favor of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) attorneys2 reduces the
likelihood of granting asylum by 2.8 % during the 15-days after hearing such cases. In other
words, receiving opinions of the board about past erroneous grants makes immigration judges
more stringent. On the other hand, receiving opinions of the board about past erroneous
rejection in a case does not affect judges’ asylum decisions for other cases.
To investigate a potential mechanism through which receiving board’s opinion can
affect asylum decisions, I focus on the appealing behavior of immigrants and prosecutors.
Cases that are decided after a judge hears remanded appeals in favor of prosecutors are less
2

Throughout Chapter 3 I will use the terms government attorneys, DHS attorneys, and prosecutors
interchangeably to refer to the party who is pursuing deportation of the immigrant.

4

likely to be appealed by the losing party. In particular, immigrants are 3.5 % less likely
to appeal rejected asylums, and prosecutors are 25% less likely to appeal granted asylums
after judges receive remanded cases in favor of prosecutors. This suggests that an increase
in the accuracy of judges’ decisions (as perceived by the losing party) is a potential channel
through which receiving remanded cases affect judges’ decisions.

5

Chapter 2. Terrorist Attacks and Asylum Decisions of the Judges
2.1. Introduction
Growing attention to terrorism since 9/11 has resulted in the documentation of various effects of such phenomena and the 9/11 attack has been used to investigate the adverse
effects of terrorist attacks on immigrants. For example, the attack resulted in a significant
reduction in the flow of funds for managers with Middle-Eastern sounding names (Kumar,
Niessen-Ruenzi, & Spalt, 2015). The 9/11 attack has impacted high-stakes judicial decisions
as well. After the terrorist attack, Latin-American defendants were more likely to receive
an unfavorable outcome than the White or African-American defendants in U.S. federal
courts (McConnell & Rasul, 2021). Similarly, during the year after the incident, U.S. immigration judges have denied Muslim countries’ applicants asylum applications more than
applicants from other countries (Brodeur & Wright, 2019). These strands of literature have
documented a shift in attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and the possibility of spill-overs
between different immigrant groups in the aftermath of the 9/11.
Despite these strands of evidence, there is a gap in understanding the impact of domestic and transnational terrorist attacks in settings that directly affect immigrants, such
as asylum decisions. This is important since there has been growing evidence linking domestic terrorism to immigration. For instance, analyzing data from 1980 to 2004, an increase
in immigration in Western Europe has been linked to an increase in Right-wing terrorism
(McAlexander, 2019). Moreover, analysis of the European countries during the post 9/11
period has shown that news about domestic terrorist attacks triggers negative sentiments
towards immigrants. In addition, the impact of domestic terrorism on migration concerns is
robust even when the attacks are happening in neighboring countries (Böhmelt et al., 2020).
6

Given that terrorist attacks are not isolated events, and there have been more than 440
terrorism incidents in the U.S. between 2004 and 20191 , it is unclear whether these attacks
affect the asylum decisions of judges, and the existing evidence on the impact of terrorist
attacks on asylum decisions in the U.S relies solely on the 9/11 terrorist attack (Brodeur &
Wright, 2019).
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of terrorist attacks on asylum decisions of
U.S. immigration judges during the post 9/11 period. The institutional changes in the U.S.
immigration system enacted due to the 9/11 attack, including the changes in enforcement
and adjudication functions, impose a challenge in isolating the effect of institutional changes
from the effect of the incident itself. As a result, I focus on the period after the passage of
Homeland Security Act to identify the impact of terrorist attacks on asylum decisions. I find
that between 2004 and 2019, asylum applications adjudicated during the sixty days after a
terrorist attack in the courts’ states have a 1.9 percent lower likelihood of being granted. By
decomposing the effect of terrorist attacks by the ideology of perpetrators I show that with
the exception of Left-wing terrorist attacks, all incidents reduce the likelihood of granting
asylum. The magnitude of the effects is largest in case of Islamic terrorist attacks, and judges
are 3.5 % less likely to grant asylum after such incidents. On the other hand, Right-wing
attack reduce the likelihood of granting asylum by 2.3 %, and finally, Lone-wolf incidents
cause a 1.9 % reduction in likelihood of granting asylum. Overall, the evidence suggest that
asylum decision are impacted by both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks.
Several aspects of asylum applications make these adjudications a unique setting
prone to influence by external stimuli. First, refugee laws provide protection grounds for
1

Author’s calculation from the Global Terrorism Data.
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applicants who meet specific definitions based on the U.N. 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocols. However, the provisions of protections do not mandate providing permanent benefits to
the applicants. For example, applicants do not need to be granted permanent status in the
hosting country, and they may be deported to a third safe country. As a result, U.S. asylum
law is a domestic law adjoined to the international law of refuge which has added domestic
sources of interpretive authority to grant asylum (Anker, 2011, Chapter 1).2 In line with
this, evidence from political science literature indicate that national interests and normative
considerations play a role in asylum applications’ outcome (e.g, Rottman, Fariss, & Poe,
2009; Salehyan & Rosenblum, 2008). Thus, external incidents such as terrorist attacks that
can increase security concerns may affect the judges’ decisions.
Second, the conditions under which asylum applicants flee from the place of persecution make it unlikely to “collect dossier of paperwork”3 and the federal rules of evidence
do not apply in immigration courts (Anker, 2011, p.87). Consequently, the applicant’s testimony is given special weight in asylum courts, typically referred to as “the benefit of the
doubt” principle. On the other hand, understandable motives to transgress the laws to access the generous benefits of asylum by applicants increase the uncertainty around provided
claims. Therefore the judges’ willingness in giving the applicants benefit of the doubt is
an important factor in determining credibility of the claims (Miller et al., 2015). Miller et
al. (2015) argue that judges’ legal backgrounds determine part of the heterogeneity in their
preference for national interest, normative considerations, and the legally irrelevant factors
that might shape the degree to which they give the applicants the benefit of the doubt.
2
3

See §§1.4-1.5 for a discussion on the scope of domestic and international law as sources of asylum law.
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F .3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cic. 2005)
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For example, an asylum seeker has a higher chance of a favorable decision if the judge has
an employment history in a non-profit organization(NGO) rather than The Department of
Homeland Security(DHS) (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007).
A separate line of research has focused on the effects of external shocks on human
perception and judgment.4 Within the court setting, emotional shocks such as the unexpected loss of a favorite college football team can increase sentences’ length in juvenile courts
(Eren & Mocan, 2018). Emotional shock due to the loss of the judges’ cities’ football teams
also reduces the asylum grant rates (Chen, 2017). Asylum officers in France are more likely
to grant asylum applications in the day after a migrant shipwreck (Emeriau, 2021). Several
studies have focused on the intersection of group identity and bias in the face of terrorist attacks (e.g, Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Shayo & Zussman, 2011; Legewie,
2013). For instance, Emeriau (2021) finds that asylum officers in France are also less likely
to grant applications of Syrian and Iraqi refugees the day after a terrorist attack. Focusing
on the 9/11 terrorist attack, McConnell and Rasul (2021) documents an increase in sentence
length of Hispanic defendants in federal courts. The 9/11 incident has also systematically
affected how immigration judges consider certain factors in their decisions, such as whether
the applicant speaks Arabic or comes from countries sponsoring terrorism (Holmes & Keith,
2010).
Closer to the topic of investigation in this paper, the 9/11 incident has been used
to document a reduction in asylum grants to Muslim applicants in comparison to other
nationalities in the immigration courts (Brodeur & Wright, 2019). The authors report a 3.2
percent reduction in the likelihood of a favorable decision among asylum applicants from
4

See (Mocan, 2020) for a review of biases in judicial decision making.
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Muslim-majority countries than the rest of asylum seekers due to the 9/11 attack. My
paper differs from their study in several important aspects. First, the hypothesis that they
test (whether the 9/11 attack has adversely affected Muslim applicants compared to other
applicants) differs from the question this essay provides an answer for.
This essay investigates the extent to which the universe of terrorist attacks in the
U.S. , transnational and domestic, have impacted asylum adjudications. This is particularly
important given the emerging evidence linking domestic terrorism with attitude towards
immigrants and immigration (McAlexander, 2019; Böhmelt et al., 2020). Second, the data
used in their paper include a period (2000-2004) that makes it challenging to isolate judicial
discretion because of the institutional changes happening. In particular, due to the 9/11
attack, the period between 2001-2003 involves an institutional shift in the U.S. immigration
system5 which complicates the investigation of the effect of terrorist attacks on immigration
courts’ outcomes. Thus, the current study estimates the effect of terrorist attacks on the
asylum adjudications in the U.S. immigration courts over fifteen years after the institutional
reforms were implemented.
I use the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s (EOIR) electronic case database
published online due to the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. The dataset provides a detailed
history of motions, applications, hearings, trials, adjudications, and appeals for immigration
court cases. As a result, I can exclude administrative conclusions, instances in which the
judge removes a case from the calendar based on non-merit reasons, and withdrawals of
asylum applications to focus on the merit-based decisions of grant or denial in asylum applications. I find robust evidence of a reduction in the probability of grants due to terrorist
5

See Section 2.2 for detailed discussion.
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attacks. In particular, cases adjudicated during the sixty days after a terrorist attack in the
courts’ state have a 1.9 percent (0.8 percentage point) lower probability of receiving asylum. Applicants from Latin American countries consistently bear the burden of reduction
in asylum grants. In addition, while sensitive to the specification choice, there is evidence
that Chinese applicants bear the reduction in asylum grants. In contrast to the findings of
studies focusing on 9/11, there is no evidence of the adverse effects of terrorist attacks on
applicants from Muslim Majority countries.
To investigate the role of media coverage in driving the effects, I have collected data
on national news coverage of the incidents.6 Terrorist attacks in the courts’ states affect
the judges’ decisions regardless of being covered by national news channels. Thus, incidents
selected into national news coverage do not have a differential effect on the judges’ decisions.
However, I provide evidence that terrorist attacks covered by national news channels affect
decisions of judges’ in other states that are not under attack. In particular, judges are
1.2 percent less likely to grant asylum applications when exposed to the news coverage of
incidents outside the court’s state. Given that incident selected into national news coverage
have no differential impact on judges within the attacked states, I suggest that information
dissemination is a potential source for the documented spill-over in the effects.
I hand-collected information on judges’ backgrounds to investigate potential explanatory channels. First, I focus on the judges’ age and tenure. Results indicate that only older
judges’ decisions are affected by terrorist attacks. Similarly, investigating heterogeneous effects due to judges’ tenure reveals that the incidents affect high tenure judges. Consequently,
due to the data limitation in isolating the effect of tenure and age from each other, it remains
6

In particular, I have collected data on the coverage by CNN, ABC, NBC, or CBS.
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inconclusive whether it is the tenure or the age (or both) that results in the documented
heterogeneity. Second, I document that judges’ gender does not drive the results, and both
female and male judges become stringent due to the terrorist attacks. Finally, I show that
the results are driven by changes in the decision of judges who have been appointed during
a Democrat president’s term.
2.2. Institutional Setting
2.2.1. Asylum Application in U.S.
Asylum application in the U.S. can be pursued affirmatively or defensively by submitting the Form I-598.7 An affirmative process starts with a voluntary application of asylum
by an applicant to one of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) asylum offices. An
asylum officer then decides on the case’s credibility and eligibility and renders a decision
after non-adversarial interviews. If the officer denies the asylum and the applicant does
not hold a valid immigration status in the U.S., then he is put in removal proceeding8 in
immigration courts for a de novo hearing in front of an immigration judge. On the other
hand, the defensive asylum process involves an immigrant who has been apprehended inside
the U.S. or at the ports of entry and is already in removal proceedings when applying for
asylum for the first time.9
When an applicant is filing form I-598, she can apply for two important types of reliefs
by checking the relevant boxes: (1) Asylum and (2) Withholding of Removal.10 There are
7

I-598, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. See: https://www.uscis.gov/i-589
Prior to Immigration and Nationality Act reforms of 1997, based on the point of custody, applicants were
put in deportation or exclusion procedure. After reforms took place, these were combined in the removal
procedure. Regardless, in all of these processes, the responsible agency within government is seeking removal
of the alien from the U.S. and the case is heard in front of immigration judges.
9
More information regarding these two pathways can be found in Chapter 1, and specifically §§1:8-1:9 of
the Anker (2011)
10
I have left out protection under the convention against torture (CAT) which is based on the 1951
8
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two essential differences between these applications. First, asylum is a discretionary relief,
meaning that the judge has no obligation to grant the asylum. Thus, the judge might admit
discretionary factors in granting or denying an asylum application on a case-by-case basis.11
On the other hand, withholding of removal is a mandatory relief, which means that if the
applicant can establish a credible fear of persecution upon deportation and is eligible for the
relief
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, the judge must grant withholding of removal.

Second, the benefits provided by these two reliefs are substantially different. A person
who receives asylum can remain in the U.S. for an indefinite period, apply for permanent
residency after one year, and become an American citizen after five years. The person can
petition to bring eligible family members to the U.S. as well. In contrast, withholding of
removal does not include any status in the U.S. and only protects the granted applicant
from immediately being deported. This protection is temporary, and if the conditions in the
applicant’s country change or the U.S. government can find another safe country to accept
the applicant, then the DHS can deport the person.
This chapter focuses on asylum applications because it is the most beneficial relief
for the applicant. As a result, it incurs a higher cost of making errors, specifically erroneous
grants of the application for the judges. Besides, since it is a discretionary form of relief
for the judges to grant, it involves a trade-off between the amount of risk of making errors
U.N. Refugee Convention and 1980 Refugee Act. The fundamental differences between the arguments and
standards in establishing the definition of torture compared to the asylum and the substantially lower number
of adjudications are among the main reasons for this decision.
11
See Miller et al. (2015) for discussion of this. In addition, see §2:23 of Anker (2011) for discretionary
grants, and §§6:18-6:20 for some insights on discretionary considerations in denials.
12
Withholding of removal still have some eligibility bars. However, standards are much less restrictive than asylum. For instance, compare the difference in meeting the definition of “Particularly Serious Crimes”: https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/FINALAppendix-F
FINAL5thEd.pdf.
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judges are willing to accept and the benefit of the doubt they are willing to give to the
applicants. Nonetheless, since most applicants apply for both types of reliefs (Asylum and
Withholding of Removal) simultaneously, it is possible to investigate whether changes in
judges’ tendency affect the grant of the less beneficial application as well, or they shift to
granting withholding of removal after denying asylums during exposure to terrorist attacks.
2.2.2. Administrative Branches in the Asylum Process
Historically, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), an office within the
Department of Justice (DOJ), has been in charge of the asylum offices, the asylum officers,
and the immigration courts.13 After the terrorist attack of 9/11, the Homeland Security
Act
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was passed by Congress in Nov. 2002. The act effectively dissolved the INS and

transferred most of its functions to the three offices inside the newly created Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).15 Thus, on March 1, 2003, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) within the DHS assumed responsibility for asylum offices and became the
affirmative process’s initiating point. Enforcing capability also separated from the DOJ
after abolishing the INS, and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the DHS
became responsible for this duty. These changes make the period between 9/11 and the
date in which DHS officially started functioning a unique period, which involves a transition
process in immigration policies. As a result, to use a consistently comparable institutional
setting, this article focuses on all removal proceedings’ asylum applications adjudicated
13

Followed by Immigration and Nationality Act reforms of 1983, Executive Office of Immigration Review
is the internal department within the DOJ that oversee immigration courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). Before this act, the INS was the functioning entity in charge of immigration courts and
immigration offices.
14
See: https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-act-2002
15
(I) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), (II) Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and (III) Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
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between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2019. Nonetheless, I expand the period of
study to 1994-2019 as a robustness check.
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics
2.3.1. Global Terrorism Data
Data for terrorist attacks are obtained from the Global Terrorism Data (GTD), an
open-source database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, College Park. GTD
defines a terrorist attack as “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation.” Three primary attributes should be met for the GTD to consider an incident
for inclusion. The incident must be (I) intentional, (II) entail some level of violence or
immediate threat, and (III) perpetrators must be sub-national actors. There are three
additional criteria, at least two of which should be met so that GTD includes an attack.
(A) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, (B)
there must be evidence of coercion, and (C) action must be outside the legitimate warfare
context.
The data include an indicator of the success of the attacks based on the tactics and
weapons used.16 Conventionally, the literature on terrorist attacks relies only on the attacks
that meet all these criteria, and GTD marks them as successful. As a result, I examine
the exclusion of unsuccessful attacks and those that do not meet one of the three criteria
as a robustness check. A more detailed discussion of the data and relevant aspects of the
16

For instance, an assassination in which the target does not die is marked as unsuccessful, while for armed
assaults, as long as the target is hit (including people and/or buildings), the attack is marked as successful.
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different types of terrorist attacks within the data can be found in (Brodeur, 2018). Data
on the location of the terrorist attacks are used to identify the terrorist attacks’ state and
match them with the states in which the courts are located.
I define terror exposed decisions as those made during the sixty days following a
terrorist attack in the state of the court. Out of the 447 state-incidents during the study
period (Nov. 1st 2003- Dec. 31st 2019), 386 incidents happened in states with immigration
courts. Figure 2.3.1 provides an overview of months with no attack and those with at least
one terrorist attack in each of these states.
I have used the information about the terrorist groups to group the incidents into
Right-wing, Left-Wing, Islamic, and Lone-wolf. Table A.1 reports the name of terrorist
groups that belong to each category alongside the number of attacks by each group. Overall,
40 % of incidents are Right-wing terrorist attacks, 18 % are Left-wing terrorist attacks, 11 %
are Islamic terrorist attacks, and the remainder of terrorist attacks is Lonewolf or conducted
by unknown perpetrators. It is noteworthy that the GTD includes a variable that determines
whether an incident is a transnational terrorist attack or not. This variable is defined based
on the nationality of the perpetrators and the location of the attacks and, for instance, if
an already naturalized immigrant conducts a Jihadi-inspired attack, the incident will not
be considered international terrorism. Moreover, for most of the entries in the data, this
information is missing. As a result, only 4 incidents within these terrorist attacks are marked
as logistically international, all of which are Islamic incidents (there are 47 Islamic attacks).
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Figure 2.1. Distribution of Days With Terrorist-Attack Exposure in Courts’ States.
Note: Figure plots days with no terrorist attacks and days that are less than two months after at least
one terrorist attacks in the states with immigration courts. Hawaii (No Terrorist Attack between 2004
and 2019) and Puerto Rico are excluded.

2.3.2. Immigration Courts Data
Data for the immigration courts are obtained from the website of the EOIR.17 This
comprehensive data set includes case level, proceeding level, and hearing-level information
on immigration court cases. Between 2004 and 2019, there were 403,338 first on the merit
decisions for asylum applications in removal proceedings.18 Among these adjudications, I
exclude Puerto Rico and Kentucky (both with no decisions exposed to terrorist attacks).19
17

https://www.justice.gov/eoir
A first on the merit decision, in contrast to second or subsequent merit decisions, refers to the first time
a judge rejects or grants an application. Subsequent decisions can occur if the initial decision is appealed,
and the board of immigration appeal remands the case to the judge for a new round of decision, or in light
of new evidence, one of the parties file for (and receive) a motion to reconsider the case.
19
Total observation belonging to these three courts makeup 287+853= 1140 observations of total observations.
18
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Out of the remaining 402,198 adjudications, 1.5% (6,250) are in-absentia decisions. An
in-absentia decision is made in the applicant’s absence, mostly due to the applicant failing
to appear for the hearing. Almost all in-absentia decisions result in denials, with only 76
(1.2%) of these instances receiving asylum. As a result, I exclude these decisions. Out of
the remaining 395,948 observations, I exclude judges who made fewer than ten decisions and
nationalities with fewer than a hundred observations (a total of 2,277 observations). Finally,
7,823 observations belong to judges who are never exposed or always exposed to terrorist
attacks. I exclude these observations from the main analysis as well.20 The remaining sample
consists of 385,848 decisions between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2019, made by 596
judges.
Several studies have pointed out important determinants of asylum decisions (RamjiNogales et al., 2007; Eagly & Shafer, 2015; Eagly, Shafer, & Whalley, 2018). Following
this literature, an indicator for being represented by a lawyer during hearings, an indicator
of being detained during the trial, an indicator for the asylum’s pathway (affirmatively or
defensively), and applicants’ nationality fixed effects are used as case characteristics. Table
2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the EOIR data. Twenty-five percent of all decisions are
made within sixty days after a terrorist attack. Sixty-one percent of the asylum applications
are defensive. Seventeen percent of applicants are detained while waiting for a decision
on their application. The average grant rate is 41%. Finally, 90% of the applicants are
represented by a lawyer. The latter statistic is reflective of a selection into having a merit
outcome. Mean representation is much lower for the sample of all cases (regardless of whether
20

Excluded observations are added back as a robustness check.
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they reach a merit outcome) (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007; Eagly & Shafer, 2015).21 For
instance, during the period of study used in this paper (2004-2019), only 47% of all cases,
regardless of the outcome and their applications, are represented by a lawyer.
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of The Court Data
Variable:

Variable Definition:

Asylum Granted

Equals 1 if asylum application is granted.

Defensive

Equals 1 for Defensive applications.

Lawyer

Equals 1 if applicant is representedby lawyer.

Detention

Equals 1 if applicant is detained during the trial.

Criminal Charge

Equal 1 if DHS brough criminal charge(s) against the applicant
Decision Sample:

Asylum Granted
Defensive
Lawyer
Detention
Criminal Charge

N=

Full Sample

Terror Exposure:
Yes

Terror Exposure:
No

Application:
Defensive

Application:
Affirmative

0.41
(0.49)
0.61
(0.49)
0.90
(0.33)
0.17
(0.37)
0.07
(0.26)

0.39
(0.48)
0.71
(0.043)
0.89
(0.35)
0.17
(0.40)
0.05
(0.23)

0.42
(0.49)
0.57
(0.49)
0.90
(0.33)
0.16
(0.37)
0.07
(0.27)

0.28
(0.043)
1
0
0.85
(0.39)
0.27
(0.45)
0.07
(0.26)

0.61
(0.49)
0
0
0.98
(0.19)
0.01
(0.08)
0.06
(0.23)

385,848

95,696

290,152

234,311

149,525

Notes : The sample is restricted to all the initial merit adjudications for asylum applications decided
between Jan. 1,2004 and Dec. 31, 2019. An adjudication is considered to be exposed to terrorism if
there has been any terrorist attack in state of the court during the 60 days before the adjudication is
made.

2.4. Conceptual Framework
The “benefit of doubt” principle in the asylum laws has resulted in a review of
demeanor, specificity, details, and the internal consistency of claims during the trial in
21

Immigration courts do not provide a lawyer at the expense of the government. As a result, many cases
proceed without being represented in immigration courts (Eagly & Shafer, 2015).
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asylum laws’ language.22 Given the subjective nature of the decision and the observed
substantial disparity between individual judges, it is reasonable to assume that the judges’
tendency to grant asylum after the evidence is an essential determining factor. As a result,
the conceptual framework provided here builds upon the latent variable models with specific
references to Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) model of error minimization and Posner (1998)
discussion of the economic aspects of evidence search.
Immigration judges receive signals about the actual state of an asylum claim during
the trials. The judge wants to avoid granting false asylum and avoid deporting an applicant
with a valid fear of persecution based on error. As in Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) error
minimization of courts, this framework is represented by assuming individual judges minimize a weighted probability of deporting valid applicants and admitting wrong applicants.
While the subjective probability here can be judge-specific, it is a function of the evidence
presented to the judge. Given the weights a judge puts on avoiding each error type and the
subjective probabilities of making errors, there is an optimal threshold of evidence to grant
the asylum (i.e., grant if evidence’s strengths pass the threshold) for each judge. Using the
language of Alesina and La Ferrara (2014), this reflects the “standard of proof applied” by
the immigration judge or, equivalently, in the language of asylum laws, the “benefit of the
doubt” that the judge is willing to give the applicant. I hypothesize that terrorist attacks
are exogenous shocks that reduce the judges’ tendency to grant asylum, given the evidence’s
22

In general, see Anker (2011, pp 141-156) for more information on these factors in consideration of
credibility. While the REAL ID Act includes demeanor as one of the factors, and the INS provides a
definition for demeanor, it has been generally pointed as an unreliable determinant, especially due to the
cultural and political differences between the judges and the applicants. Nevertheless, demeanor arguably
is a contributing factor to an adjudicator’s subjective evaluation, especially when considering “totality of
circumstances and all the relevant factors” as it is put in the Asylum Officer Basic Training Course. See
footnote 5 in Anker (2011, p 141) and §§3:20 for more details on demeanor in credibility factors.
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strength. Within the framework provided here, this can be due to terrorist attacks affecting
judges’ evaluation of the signals they receive about the actual state of a claim or the weight
of their subjective costs of making errors shifting due to the attacks. Regarding the latter,
and by relying on the literature on terrorist attacks, I suggest that national and domestic
security concerns might play a role in this shift.
The literature on terrorist attacks suggests that terrorism incidents increase consumer
pessimism, (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008), decrease subjective well-being (Akay, Bargain, &
Elsayed, 2020) , induce safety uncertainty (Fich, Nguyen, & Petmezas, 2020) , worsen uncertainty about personal security between a firm’s employees (Nguyen, Petmezas, & Karampatsas, 2022), and increase the fear of being a potential victim (Tripathi, 2018). Political science
literature on asylum also suggests that factors such as “material and security concerns” are
evaluated more subjectively than human rights concerns and that the higher these concerns
are, the more “conservative” the approach in granting asylum (Keith, Holmes, & Miller,
2013b). This strand of evidence suggests that terrorist attacks affect concerns related to the
cost of type II error and that increase in such concerns results in less leniency by the judges.
It is noteworthy that a shift in the weight of Type-II error and the subsequently reduced
leniency can be the result of a “strategic” decision by the judges (Posner, 2010, chapter 1).
For instance, if terrorist attacks affect the judges’ perception of social intolerance towards
judicial mistakes, particularly in immigration courts, judges might respond by a transitory
reduction in the benefit of the doubt they give to the applicants.
As mentioned earlier, another possibility is terrorist attacks affecting judges’ evaluation of the signals they receive in court. In his search model, Posner (1998) argues that
requiring more persuasive evidence provides judges with the benefit of higher certainty in
21

the decision. Thus, given the cases’ stakes, judges will require evidence up to the amount
that the marginal benefit of doing so equals the marginal cost. The marginal benefit of
searching for evidence then denote how much the judge certainty increases when requiring
each (additional) piece of evidence. Terrorist attacks may affect the final decision by shifting
the evidence search function and the marginal benefit of searching for evidence.23 A likely
channel of effects leading to this is through a shift in (generalized) trust. Previous literature
suggests that terrorist attacks damage social trust (Geys & Qari, 2017; Godefroidt & Langer,
2020). Suppose terrorist attacks affect the generalized trust within the judges exposed to
attacks. In that case, the marginal benefit of testimony (or other circumstantial shreds of
evidence) is reduced, resulting in the rejection of a marginal number of cases. Furthermore,
the impact of terrorist attacks on generalized trust is transient (Godefroidt & Langer, 2020),
a notion consistent with the findings of this paper.
2.5. Empirical Specification
I estimate the following linear probability model :
Ajast = α + β × T erroristAttackst−n + γj + ηs + θt + Xa + ϵjast

(2.1)

where Ajast is the adjudication made by judge j, in the state s, at time t for the applicant
a, and it takes the value of 1 if the asylum application is granted and 0 if denied. The
key independent variable, T erroristAttackst−n , takes the value of 1 if there has been any
terrorist attack in the state s during the past n days and zero otherwise. In the benchmark
specification, n is equal to sixty days. A test of the sensitivity of results to using alternative
windows and an investigation of heterogeneous time effects is provided in the next section.
23

This can happen by systematically affecting how judges assess the quality of evidence
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Xa is a vector of time-invariant characteristics of the applicant. It includes indicators
for defensive asylum application, representation by a lawyer, detention during the trial,
having criminal charges, and an indicator for the applicants’ nationality. Judge fixed effects
are represented by γj , while ηs and θt represent state fixed effects and time fixed effects,
respectively. Finally, ϵjast is the error term. The identifying assumption needed for a causal
interpretation is that conditional on controlling for the relevant observable characteristics,
unobservable factors affecting asylum application outcomes are exogenous to the factors
determining the location and timing of terrorist attacks.
A comparison between defensive and affirmative applications in Table 2.1 indicates
that defensive asylums are more likely to be rejected. Moreover, asylum adjudications made
during exposure to terrorist attacks are more likely to include defensive applications (71%
versus 51%). Thus, it is essential to test the randomness assumption. To do so, I run a set
of regressions where the terrorist attack indicator is regressed on a case characteristic after
controlling for state and year fixed effects. If terrorist attacks are random with regards to the
case characteristics, then these characteristics should have no explanatory power in determining the exposure status. Each cell in Table 2.2 reports the coefficient of the characteristic
for one of these regressions. The p-value for joint significance based on regressions that include all variables is reported at the bottom of the table. None of the point estimates are
different from zero. Furthermore, the p-value of the joint significance (0.43) indicates that
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which is consistent with the randomness assumption.
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Table 2.2. Randomness Tests for Terrorist
Attacks
Dependent Variable:
Terrorist Attack Indicator
Defensive Application

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.011
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.006
(0.008)

Detention
Criminal Charge
Lawyer

Joint Significance (p-value)
N=

0.43
385,848

Notes : Table present results for investigation of
randomness of terrorist attacks and composition
of asylum cases. Each cell represent results of a
separate regression of the terrorist attack indicator being regressed on a case characteristic. Terrorist Attack indicator takes value of 1 if there has
been any terrorist attack during the past 60 days
in the state of the court. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

2.5.1. Results
Results for baseline estimates of the impact of terrorist attacks are reported in Table
2.3. Specifications reported in all columns include judge-fixed effects and state-fixed effects.
Standard errors, clustered at the judge level, are reported in parentheses. Column (1) reports
the result of a specification that includes nationality-by-year fixed effects. The specification
reported in Column (2) adds decision date fixed effects. The magnitude of the point estimate
for the terror attack indicator remains unchanged across the specifications. The model
reported in Column (3) replaces nationality-by-year fixed effects with year and nationality
fixed effects, and finally, Column (4) reports a model that controls for nationality-specific
trends and decision date fixed effects. The results indicate that, on average, terrorist attacks
cause a 0.8 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of receiving asylum. Given that the
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Table 2.3. Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Asylum Outcomes
Variables
T erroristAttack
Defensive (1= Yes)
Lawyer (1= Yes)
Detention (1= Yes)
Criminal Charge (1= Yes)

Judge FE
State FE
Nationality FE
Year FE
Nationality by Year FE
Nationality Specific Linear Trend
Decision Date FE
Mean Dependent Variable :
N:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.086***
(0.004)
0.060***
(0.004)
-0.10***
(0.009)
-0.083***
(0.006)

-0.008***
(0.003)
-0.087***
(0.004)
0.060***
(0.004)
-0.10***
(0.010)
-0.082***
(0.006)

-0.007***
(0.003)
-0.084***
(0.004)
0.065***
(0.005)
-0.095***
(0.007)
-0.093***
(0.005)

-0.008***
(0.003)
-0.082***
(0.005)
0.061***
(0.004)
-0.10***
(0.009)
-0.085***
(0.007)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
0.41
385,848

0.41
385,848

0.41
385,848

0.41
385,848

Notes : Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors clustered at the judge level. Sample includes all initial merit adjudications between Jan. 1,2004 and Dec. 31, 2019.
T erroristAttack is an indicator of any terrorist attack during the past 60 days in the
state of the court. Defensive is an indicator of application type, taking value of 1 for
defensive applications. Detention is an indicator taking value of 1 if the applicant is
detained during his proceeding. Criminal charge takes value of 1 if there is a criminal
charge among the charges that DHS brought against the applicant. Nationality FE
represent indicators of applicant’s nationality. There are 110 different nationalities in
the sample.

average grant rate is 41 percent, this translates into a 1.9 percent reduction in the likelihood
of receiving asylum.
Recall that the applicants can apply for Asylum and Withholding of Removal simultaneously. Since the asylum has substantially higher benefits, applicants are less likely to
pursue a verdict on their withholding application once they receive asylum. For instance,
out of the sample’s 385,848 cases, 78% (300,448) have applied for both asylum and withholding of removal simultaneously. However, only 79% (236,766) of them have received an
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adjudication on their withholding application in addition to the asylum decision. Not surprisingly, 91% (215,737) of these instances involve applicants whose asylum application has
been denied, which suggest that those applicants are more likely to pursue an adjudication
on their withholding of removal application.
To investigate the possibility that terrorist attacks result in judges shifting Asylum
grants to Withholding of Removal (not providing permanent benefits, but also not deporting
immediately), I repeat the regressions using the withholding of removal applications’ outcome
as the dependent variable. I do this for the sample of applicants whose asylum has been
denied. Table 2.4 reports the results of this investigation. While the significance of the
reported results is sensitive to the specification, the evidence suggests that terrorist attacks
adversely affect adjudications of Withholding of Removals for applicants whose asylum has
been denied. In particular, terrorist attacks cause a four percent (0.2 p.p) reduction in the
likelihood of receiving a Withholding of Removal for the rejected asylum applications. This
suggests that the effects are such that judges become stricter on both fronts and are not
merely substituting granting the permanent benefit with temporary protections.
2.5.2. Robustness of Results
Various sensitivity analyses and a placebo test are conducted to explore the robustness
of the results. Table 2.5 reports specifications testing the results’ sensitivity to excluding
state and case-level fixed effects, using alternative terrorist incident indicators, expanding
the sample period to 1994-2019, and adding back excluded observations. Column (2) reports
a specification that excludes state and case level fixed effects and only uses judge fixed effects,
year fixed effects, and month fixed effects. As a result, nationality-by-year fixed effects were
replaced with year fixed effects. Next, the specification reported in Column (3) adds state
26

Table 2.4. Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Withholding of Deportations Outcomes
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.002*
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.002*
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Case level FE
Judge FE

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Year FE
Nationality by Year FE
Decision Date FE
Nationality Specific Linear Trend

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

0.05
215,734

0.05
215,734

Terrorist Attack

Mean Dependent Variable:
N:

Yes

0.05
215,734

0.05
215,734

Notes : Table provides results for regressions based on Equation 2.1 that use
adjudications of withholding applications as dependent variable. Withholding application temporarily protect the applicant from being deported, but do
not grant asylum and thus provide the permanent benefits. Sample include
all cases that their asylum has been denied (during Jan. 1,2004 and Dec.
31, 2019). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the judge
level.

fixed effects, and finally, the case level time-invariant characteristics are added in the model
summarized in Column (4). Once accounting for any time-invariant state-specific effects,
there is evidence of a 1.3 percentage point reduction in asylum grants. The specification
used in Column (5) includes a yearly linear trend instead of year and month fixed effects.
Recall that I rely on the comprehensive list of terrorist attacks between 2004-2019.
Conventionally, the literature investigating the effects of terrorist attacks focuses on the
incidents that meet all three criteria discussed in section 2.3 and are marked as successful
as well. Column (6) of Table 2.5 reports a specification using a dependent variable that
takes the value of one only if adjudications are made after a terrorist attack that is marked
as successful in the data and meets all three criteria. The point estimate is almost the
same as the benchmark, implying that the difference between these two types of incidents is
not significant enough to produce meaningful differences. The sample used in the analysis
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Table 2.5. Robustness of Results
Variables:
Terrorist Attack

Judge FE
State FE
Case level FE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.013***
(0.004)

-0.003
(0.003)

-0.013***
(0.003)

-0.007***
(0.003)

-0.011***
(0.002)

-0.007***
(0.003)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.009***
(0.002)

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

385,848

402,198

649,934

Time FEs:
Month of Year
Year
Nat. By Year

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yearly Trend
N:

Yes
385,848

385,848

385,848

385,848

385,848

Notes : Table provides robustness checks. Column (6) uses benchmark specification and replaces all terrorist attacks with attacks that are successful and meets all three criteria defined by the Global Terrorism Data (See Section
2.3). Column (7) adds omitted observations (countries with less than 100 observations, second round of decisions
after appeals, and never treated judges) to the sample, and finally the sample used in Column (8) expands the time
period used in to 1994-2019 and include all observations. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at
the judge level.

reported in Column (7) adds the excluded observations discussed in section 2.3.2. Finally,
Column (8) reports a specification that extends the analysis period from 2004-2019 to 19942019. Doing this does not change the magnitude of the point estimate. Nonetheless, with
the policy changes after 1998 and the transition in the immigration policy of the U.S. after
the 9/11 attack, which became effective in 2003, results from the estimations that use the
benchmark sample are more reliable.
In the benchmark sample, about 69% of the cases are adjudicated in California (19%),
Florida (14%), New York (26%), and Texas (9%). Moreover, 86% of all the terrorist attack
exposed observations in the benchmark sample are from these four states. Thus, it might
be possible that observations from these states drive the results. To investigate this, I have
obtained point estimates using samples that exclude each state at a time. Figure 2.2 plots
the point estimates and confidence intervals for these estimations. As reported in the table,
the significance of point estimates is insensitive to excluding any of the states.
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Figure 2.2. Robustness of Results to Exclusion of States.
Note: Figure plots coefficients and confidence intervals for estimations dropping one
state at a time. All estimations use the specification used in Column (2) of Table 2.3.
Benchmark includes all states

Table 2.6 reports point-estimates for specifications using alternative duration of effects. The first column uses a dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if the adjudication
is made during the 30-days after a terrorist attack in the court’s state. Column (2) reports
the benchmark specification used in the main table (Table 2.3), which uses a 60-days window
of effects. Finally, the third and fourth columns expand this duration to 90-days and 120days, respectively. Results are insensitive to the expansion of the window of effect, which
suggest that the effect of terrorist attack might last longer than sixty days. To understand
whether this is driven by larger effects during the initial months or terrorist attacks affect
judges’ decisions even if the decisions are made farther in time relative to the incidents.
Investigation of heterogeneous time effects provided in the next subsection is intended to
answer this question and the extent of changes in the effects over time.
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Table 2.6. Sensitivity to Treatment Period
30-days

60-days

90-days

120-days

Terrorist Attack

-0.006**
(0.003)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.006***
(0.002)

Case Level FE
Judge FE
Nationality By Year FE
N:

Yes
Yes
Yes
385,848

Yes
Yes
Yes
385,848

Yes
Yes
Yes
385,848

Yes
Yes
Yes
385,848

Note: This table report point-estimates of estimations for which the independent variable of interest (T erroristAttack) takes value of one using an
expanded duration of effects. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
clustered at judge level.

2.5.3. Heterogeneous Time Effects and Falsification Test
There is evidence that the effect of terrorist attacks on attitudes towards immigrants
is short-lived and decreasing over time (Tripathi, 2018). Thus the impact of the terrorist
attacks may change over time. I test various specifications to investigate the impact of
distance between adjudication and incident date on the magnitude of effects. A typical
test for this purpose is running regressions that use indicators for the relative times of the
decision compared to terrorist attacks. To do so, I estimate the following model:

Ajast = α0 +

3
X
n=1

βn × T errorst−n +

3
X

βm × T errorst+m + γj + ηs + θt + Xa + ϵjast (2.2)

m=1

where T errorst−n are a set of dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the attack’s date
lags the decision date by n months and zero otherwise. For example, T errorst−2 takes the
value of 1 when an attack has happened between 31 days to 60 days before the adjudication.
Similarly, T errorst+m are a set of dummies when the attack’s date leads to the adjudication
date, and they capture possible anticipatory effects. For instance, T errorst+2 takes the value
of 1 if there will be an attack 31 to 60 days after an asylum decision. As a result, the point
estimates of coefficients for T errorst+m serve as a falsification test.
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Table 2.7 reports the point estimates for these indicators. Column (1) breaks down
the main variable used in the paper into two indicators for the first and second months
immediately after a terrorist attack. Results reported in Column (1) suggest that the effect
of a terrorist attack is driven by both months during the first sixty days. Column (2)
reports point estimates for a similar exercise that uses indicators for the four months after
the attacks. Results suggest that judges are less likely to grant asylum to applicants during
the first and second months after terrorist attacks; however, the null effect for the third and
four months indicators cannot be rejected. A comparison of this column, and the last column
of Table 2.6 which reported point-estimate for using a 4-month window of effect (-0.006***)
suggests that the reported result (in Table 2.6) was driven by larger effects on the judges’
decision during the first two months and that the short-term effect of terrorist attacks lasts
up to sixty days.
Column (3) of Table 2.7 reports point-estimate for anticipatory effects, which serves
as a falsification test as well. As expected, future terrorist attacks do not affect the judges’
decisions. Finally, the last two columns report specifications that simultaneously include
leads and lags.
2.6. Heterogeneity Analysis
Previous sections established that terrorist attacks reduce the likelihood of receiving
asylum among the applicants. This section investigates various potential sources of heterogeneity to understand better the possible channels driving this effect. In particular, it
is possible to examine the association of terrorist groups ideologies, characteristics of the
judges, the nationality of applicants, and news coverage of the incidents on the effect of
terrorist attacks.
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Table 2.7. Dynamic Effects and Falsification Test
T erroristAttackst−1
T erroristAttackst−2

(1)

(2)

-0.004
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.003)

-0.004
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)

T erroristAttackst−3
T erroristAttackst−4
T erroristAttackst+1
T erroristAttackst+2
T erroristAttackst+3
N=

359,036

359,036

(3)

0.008
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.002)
359,036

(4)

(5)

-0.004*
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.003)

-0.004*
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.003)
359,036

0.009
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.008)

359,036

Note: Table provide results for dynamic effects and falsification tests for
benchmark sample. All columns’ specification include judge fixed effects,
full set of case characteristics and fixed effects used in main specification.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at judge level. A set
of dummies, T erroristAttackst−n , are used to indicate the relative time
of attack (in month) in reference to the adjudication date. For instance,
T erroristAttackst−2 is a dummy that takes value of 1 if there has been an
attack in the state of the court during the 31-60 days prior to an adjudication. Similarly, T erroristAttackst+2 takes value of one if there will be
an attack in state of the court between 31-60 days after an adjudication is
made.

2.6.1. Type of Terrorist Attacks
I have used the information about the terrorist groups to group the incidents into
Right-wing, Left-Wing, Islamic, and Lone-wolf. Table A.1 reports the name of terrorist
groups that belong to each category alongside the number of attacks by each group. It is
noteworthy that the GTD data includes a variable that determines whether an incident is
a transnational terrorist attack or not. This variable is defined based on the nationality of
the perpetrators and the location of the attacks and for most of the entries in the data, this
information is missing. Overall, only 4 incidents within these terrorist attacks are marked
as logistically international, all of which are Islamic incidents. As a result, to the degree
that Islamic attacks represent a transnational terrorist ideology, this category proxies both
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Islamic and transnational terrorist attacks, and the remaining incidents can be considered
domestic terrorism.
It is noteworthy that there instances of simultaneous exposure to various terrorist
attacks types. For instance, out of the 53,803 decisions during the two months after a Rightwing terrorist attack, 8,241 are also within a two month distance to a Left-wing terrorist
attack. Right-wing attacks and Islamic attacks also coincide for about 20% of the decisions
exposed to Islamic attacks. As a result, treatment status as defined by exposure to each
group is fuzzy during some periods. To overcome this, I have excluded all decisions that are
exposed to more than one type of incidents. This way the treatment status takes a sharp
design, and I can decompose the main variable into four different components.
Table 2.8 reports the result of this investigation. Given that by excluding the decisions that are exposed to multiple incident types the sample has changed, I have estimated
coefficient of terrorist attack, as defined in the main table for the new sample. Column (1)
report the replication of main result for the new sample which is identical to the benchmark
results reported in Table 2.3. Second column of Table 2.8 reports a regression that include
decomposed indicator for terrorist attack to determine the type of the incidents. Left-wing
terrorist attacks are the only type of incident that do not affect the asylum decisions. Overall, Islamic terrorist attacks reduce the likelihood of granting asylum by 3.6 %. Right-wing
attack on the other hand reduce the likelihood of granting asylum by 2.3 %, and finally,
Lone-wolf incidents cause a 1.9 % reduction in likelihood of granting asylum. Results indicate that the magnitude of the effect of Islamic attacks indicator is the largest, and that both
of the domestic and transnational terrorist attacks affect asylum decisions. Interestingly, the
average effect of Islamic terrorist attacks documented in this chapter (3.6%) is close to the
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Table 2.8. Decomposition of Effects: Perpetrators
Ideologies
(1)
T erroristAttackst−60

(2)

-0.008***
(0.002)

Islamic T erroristAttackst−60

-0.015**
(0.007)
-0.010**
(0.004)
0.002
(0.009)
-0.008**
(0.004)

Right W ing T erroristAttackst−60
Lef t W ing T erroristAttackst−60
Lone W olf T erroristAttackst−60

N=

361,214

361,214

Note: Regressions use the same specification as the benchmark results, reported in Column (2) of Table 2.3. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.

reduction in grant of asylum to Muslim majority applicants (relative to other immigrants)
as a result of 9/11 (3.2 %) which Brodeur (2018) has documented.
2.6.2. Characteristics of Judges
I have relied on the names of judges and the biographies of the sworn judges published
by the EOIR to hand-collected information on judge characteristics.24 This information includes gender, graduation year from college, and the judges’ appointment year. I calculate
judges’ tenure and determine the appointing President’s political party using the appointment dates. Age is proxied by using the year of graduation from college. Table 2.9 reports
the summary statistics of judges’ characteristics for the sample of adjudications. The average
age is approximately 55. The average tenure is 9.8 years, judges appointed by Republican
presidents make 40% of decisions, and female judges make 43% of the decisions. On average,
male judges are two years older than female judges and have lower grant rates.
24

For a few judges, I have relied on their personal website, Linkedin page, or other websites/articles
mentioning their history.
25
I was unable to determine the political party of one judge. Due to this, number of judges and decisions
for Democrat and Republican judges sum to a slightly lower number in comparison to all judges. In addition,
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Table 2.9. Summary Statistics of Immigration Judges
Age
Tenure
Grant Rate
Republican
Female

N(Judges)=
N(Decisions)=

All Judges

Male

Female

Democrat

Republican

54.80
(8.73)
9.79
(7.66)
0.41
(0.48)
0.39
(0.49)
0.43
(0.50)

55.76
(8.94)
9.93
(7.74)
0.34
(0.48)
0.41
(0.49)
-

53.56
(9.07)
9.59
(7.55)
0.50
(0.50)
0.33
(0.48)
-

54.87
(8.03)
9.95
(6.59)
0.41
(0.49)
0.47
(0.50)

55.16
(9.68)
9.50
(9.10)
0.41
(0.49)
0.38
(0.48)

603
385,848

356
214,047

247
165,596

304
228,451

29925
151,012

Note: Table provide summary statistics for characteristics of the judges for
sample of sample of asylum adjudications. Number in parentheses are standard deviations.

Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report the results for investigation of age and tenure effects
respectively. This is done by interacting terrorist attack indicator with indicators of abovemedian age (OlderJudge) and above-median tenure (ExperiencedJudge). The first two
columns in each table report the main effects of the indicators. Note that the specification
reported in the second column includes appointment-year fixed effects (for investigation of
heterogeneity based on age) and birth-year fixed effects (for investigation of heterogeneity
due to tenure). To the degree that the variations of the age judges start their career allows
estimation of the age effect, results in the first two columns of Tables 2.10 and 2.11 suggest
that older judges have lower grant rates and experienced judges have higher grant rates.
Table 2.10 reports the results for investigating heterogeneity between younger and
older judges. Results reported in Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the marginal difference
of the effects between younger and older judges is (I) more significant than the effect of
terrorist attacks and (II) is statistically different from zero. It is noteworthy that the effect
information regarding the year of bachelor for three judges were not available. As a result, tables that report
analysis which uses age or tenure have marginally lower number of observations.
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Table 2.10. Heterogeneity of Effects: Judges’ Age and Effects of Terrorist Attacks
T erroristAttack (β1 )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.010***
(0.003)

-0.010***
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.004)
-0.010*
(0.006)

-0.001
(0.013)

-0.022*
(0.012)

-0.000
(0.007)
-0.018*
(0.010)
-0.018
(0.012)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

T erroristAttack × OlderJudge (β2 )
OlderJudge

Case Level FEs
Nationality By Year FE
Judge Variables:
Judge FE
Appointment-Year FE

Yes

P-Value of Wald Test:
β1 + β2
N=

384,234

384,234

(0.00)

(0.00)

384,234

384,234

Note: This table provide results for heterogeneous effects due to judges’ age. All
columns’ specification include Judge fixed effect, state fixed effect, and case level
fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the judge
level.

of terrorist attacks on the decisions of older judges is equal to β1 + β2 , and the Wald-test
rejects that this is equal to zero in both specifications. Thus, estimations reported in both
columns reject the null and indicate that terrorist attacks have a negative and statistically
significant effect (ranging from -0.018 to -0.007) on older judges, and they do not affect
judges’ decisions when they are younger.
Table 2.11 reports the results regarding the tenure of judges. Comparison of columns
(3) and (4) indicate that the effect of terrorist attacks on inexperienced judges (β1 ) is sensitive
to the inclusion of judge-fixed effects. Specifically, the specification that uses birth-year
fixed effects, reported in Column (3), cannot reject that the effect on inexperienced judges
is different from zero. Moreover, the effect on experienced judges (β1 + β2 ) is significant
in both specifications. Given that the individual differences among judges are an essential
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Table 2.11. Heterogeneity of Effects: Judges’ Tenure and Effects of Terrorist
Attacks
T errorisAttack (β1 )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.010***
(0.003)

-0.007***
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.003)
-0.009*
(0.05)

0.030**
(0.014)

0.032***
(0.013)

-0.001
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.010)
0.029**
(0.013)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

384,234

(0.00)
384,234

T erroristAttack × ExperiencedJudge (β2 )
ExperiencedJudge

Control Variables
Nationality By Year FE
Judge Variables:
Judge FE
Birth-Year FE

Yes

P-Value of Wald Test:
β1 + β2
N=

384,234

(0.00)
384,234

Note: This table provide results for heterogeneous effects due to judges’ tenure terms. All
columns’ specification include Judge fixed effect, state fixed effect, and case level fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the judge level.

determinant of immigration cases outcomes, the specification that uses judge fixed effects
is the specification of choice for concluding. Results indicate that (I) judges are affected by
terrorist attacks at later stages of their career, and (II) the impact is more substantial when
they are more experienced. Given the colinearity of tenure and age, results are inconclusive
in distinguishing whether the age or tenure (or both) results in the reported heterogeneity.
Table 2.12 reports the results for examining heterogeneity in effects due to the judges’
gender. Female judges have a 5.6 percentage point (13 %) higher probability of granting
asylum, conditional on observable factors. Results reported in Columns (2) and (3) indicate
that the marginal difference of the effect of terrorist attacks between female and male judges
(β2 ) is not different from the zero. However, the effect on female judges, determined by
β1 + β2 is sensitive to specification. Results reported in column (2), which corresponds to a
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Table 2.12. Heterogeneity of Effects : Judges’ Gender and Effect of
Terrorist Attacks
T erroristAttack(β1 )

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.010***
(0.003)

-0.010***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.006)

0.056***
(0.018)

-0.014**
(0.006)
0.007
(0.012)
0.054***
(0.018)

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(0.39)

(0.10)

385,848

385,848

Female Judges

Male Judges

-0.009***
(0.003)

-0.007**
(0.003)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

167,905

217,943

T erroristAttack × F emaleJudge (β2 )
F emaleJudge

Case Characteristics FE
Judge FE
State FE
Nationality-by-Year FE
P-Value of Wald Test:
β1 + β2
N=

385,848

Panel B
Terrorist Attack

Case Controls
Judge FE
State FE
Nationality-by-Year FE
N=

Note: Table provide results for heterogeneous effects due to gender of the judges.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at judge level.

specification that uses gender fixed effect which cannot reject that the overall effect on female
judges is zero. On the other hand, once judge-fixed effects are included, the estimated effect
of terrorist attacks on female judges is different from zero. Panel B of Table 2.12 reports
point estimates for split samples of female and male judges. Results reported in this part
are in line with the judge fixed effect specification reported in the last column of Panel A,
indicating that terrorist attacks affect all judges’ decisions, regardless of their gender.
Given the growing body of works documenting differences between Democrat and
Republican judges, it is interesting to examine whether the effects of terrorist attacks might
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depend on the judges’ political affiliations. Relying on the judges’ appointment date, I use
the appointing presidents’ political party as a proxy for the judges’ political affiliation.26
Table 2.13 reports the results of this investigation. The effect of terrorist attacks on judges
appointed by Democrat presidents is determined by β1 , and the effect on judges appointed
by Republican presidents is determined by β1 + β2 .
Table 2.13. Heterogeneity of Effects: Judges’ Political Affiliation and
Effect of Terrorist Attacks
(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.010***
(0.003)

-0.012***
(0.003)
0.010*
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.017)

-0.017***
(0.005)
0.018
(0.012)
-0.008
(0.017)

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(0.88)

(0.60)

385,848

385,848

Panel B

Judges

Democrat Judges

Terrorist Attack

-0.005
(0.004)

-0.010***
(0.003)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

145,825

239,892

T erroristAttack(β1 )
T erroristAttack × RepublicanJudge(β2 )
RepublicanJudge

Case Controls
Judge FE
State FE
Nationality-by-Year FE
P-Value of Wald Test:
β1 + β2
N=

385,848

Case Controls
Judge FE
State FE
Nationality-by-Year FE
N=

Note: This table provide results for estimating heterogeneous effects of terrorist attacks due to political affiliation of the judges. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors clustered at the judge level.

26

Immigration judges are appointed by deputy attorney generals (Miller et al., 2015). I have checked
records of the attorney generals and deputy attorney generals at the time of appointment, and they all
match the political party of the presidents.
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Several points are noteworthy. First, the judge’s political party does not affect the
probability of receiving a grant on the asylum application. Second, the marginal difference
between Republican judges and their Democrat colleagues (β2 ) is positive in sign and statistically significant for the specification of interest, which uses judge-fixed effects (Column
(3)). Finally, the Wald test for the overall effect on Republican judges implies that the null
effect cannot be rejected. Panel B, reported at the bottom of the table, provides split-sample
estimations and reaffirms the findings. Terrorist attacks reduce the likelihood of grant rates
among Democrat judges by one percentage point and have no effects on judges appointed
by Republican presidents.
2.6.3. Nationality of Applicants
To investigate association of the applicants nationalities and the reported effects,
I have grouped applicants into those from Latin American countries, those from Muslim
majority countries
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, those from China, and finally, applicants from the rest of the world.

Table A.2 provides the list of countries included in each category along with the number of
observations that belong to them. Figures A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 also present bar graphs for
frequency of observations for each category, and countries within a category. Latin American
countries account for half of the observations (196,625), and Muslim Majority countries make
up twelve percent of the sample. The rest of the observations equally split between applicants
from China and the rest of the world.
Table 2.14 reports results of estimations. Column (1) establishes the main effect of
belonging to each group compared to applicants from the rest of the world. Latin American
27

I have used the Pew Research Center statistics of the Muslim population by country and defined Muslim
Majority countries as those that more than 50% of their population is Muslim.
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applicants are 28 percentage points (50%) less likely to receive asylum than the baseline (rest
of the world category) nationalities. Similarly, applicants from Muslim majority countries are
less likely to receive asylum (2.6 percentage points) than the baseline nationalities. Column
(2) reports a model that uses main effects, the model reported in Column (3) replaces
nationality-by-year fixed effects with main effects, and finally, the specification reported in
Column (4) adds decision date fixed effects.
Table 2.14. Heterogeneity of Effects: Nationality of Applicants
T erroristAttack (β1 )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.009***
(0.003)

-0.000
(0.006)
-0.012*
(0.007)
0.012
(0.007)
-0.013*
(0.007)

0.001
(0.006)
-0.014**
(0.007)
0.012
(0.009)
-0.011
(0.007)

-0.281***
(0.009)
-0.027***
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.009)

-0.004
(0.007)
-0.017**
(0.009)
0.048***
(0.012)
0.000
(0.010)
-0.277***
(0.009)
-0.035***
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.009)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.49)

(0.00)
(0.14)
(0.00)

(0.00)
(0.11)
(0.05)

385,848

385,848

385,848

T erroristAttack × LatinAmerica (α1 )
T erroristAttack × M uslimM ajority(α2 )
T erroristAttack × China(α3 )
LatinAmerica
M uslimM ajority
China

Case Characteristics FE
Judge FE
Year FE
Nationality By Year FE
Decision date FE
P-Value of Wald Test:
β1 + α1
β1 + α2
β1 + α3
N=

385,848

Notes :Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at judge level. Variable
M uslimM ajority is defined as countries with more than 50 % of their population being
Muslim. The statistics used for the share of Muslim population comes from Pew Research Center statistics of the Muslim population by country. For a list and tabulation
of countries included in each group refer to Table A.2
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The results have several implications. First, Latin American applicants are the only
group for which the effect of terrorist attacks (β1 + α1 ) is negative and statistically significant across all specifications (The p-values are boxed at the bottom of the table). Thus,
these applicants consistently bear the reduction in asylum grants reported in the benchmark
model. In particular, terrorist attacks reduce the likelihood of receiving asylum among Latin
American applicants by 2.8 percent (1.2 p.p based on Column (3)).
Second, the result for applicants of Muslim majority countries is (I) sensitive to specification and (II) positive for the specification reported in Column (2). This means that none
of the reported results suggest any adverse effects on these groups of applicants. Moreover,
the specification that incorporates group fixed effects (instead of nationality fixed effects)
indicates that terrorist attacks have a positive (β1 + α2 = 0.037) and statistically significant
effect on asylum applications of Muslim majority countries. Nonetheless, specifications that
account for country-specific differences (by using the nationality by year fixed effects), which
is an essential factor within immigration courts, reject any changes on adjudications for these
applicants. This finding is essential and contrasts with studies concluding on the effects of
terrorist attacks focusing on 9/11. During the post 9/11 era, and especially after implementing reforms in the U.S. immigration system in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack (2004-2019),
asylum decisions for applicants of Muslim majority nations have not been adversely affected
due to terrorist attacks.
Lastly, the effect on Chinese applicants (β1 + α3 ) is negative and statistically different
from zero in the preferred specification that uses nationality by year fixed effects. To summarize, the evidence strongly supports that Latin American applicants and asylum seekers from
China are the groups whose asylum applications are adversely affected by terrorist attacks.
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It is noteworthy that heterogeneous effects reported in this section are not direct evidence of
explicit bias or that immigration judges assign members of a particular group as a possible
threat by viewing them as potential terrorists. For example, if the effects are driven by a
change in how judges evaluate signals they receive in trials, then different types of evidence
might be affected heterogeneously. For instance, while the value of a written document has
not changed, applicants’ testimony becomes less worthy during the exposure times. In this
case, if the distribution of evidence (type and quality) is a function of where the applicant
is coming from, we would still observe heterogeneous effects between the overturned cases
based on the applicants’ nationality.
2.6.4. National News Coverage
Data for news coverage come from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Conducting a similar approach introduced by Brodeur (2018), I have hand-collected information on
news coverage of the incidents used in this study (2004-2019). I have relied on the name of
perpetrators, locations of incidents, and other information available in the terrorist attacks
data to check for coverage during the ten days after a terrorist attack. The most consistently
recorded data are for national news channels ABC, NBC(and MSNCB), CNN, and CBS. As
a result, I checked news coverage of incidents by these channels, using it as a proxy for
national news coverage. Thus, N ationalN ews is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the
incident is covered by any of these four channels for any number of minutes during the ten
days followed by the incident.
Table 2.15 reports the result of this investigation. Since there is a possibility of spillovers of effect to judges in other states for incidents covered by national news, I start by
separating the effects of in-state and out-of-state terrorist attacks regardless of news coverage.
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The variable InStateAttack is equivalent to the terrorist attack indicator used throughout
the paper and takes the value of 1 when the case is decided after a terrorist attack in
the court’s state. Similarly, OutofStateAttack , is used to indicate exposure for incidents
that happen out of the court’s state. Column (1) reports a specification using these two
indicators simultaneously. Terrorist attacks in other states do not affect the asylum decision
of the judges.
Table 2.15. Location of Attacks and National News Coverage
InStateAttack (β1 )
OutofStateAttack (β2 )

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.003)

-0.009***
(0.003)

-0.008***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.005**
(0.002)

InStateAttack × N ationalN ews(α1 )

0.003
(0.004)

OutofStateAttack × N ationalN ews

Case Characteristics FE
Judge FE
Nationality by Year FE

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

(0.01)

(0.02)

385,848

385,848

P-Value of Wald Test:
β1 + α1
N=

385,848

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at judge level.
Variable InStateAttack takes value of 1 if the decision is made during the
60 days after terrorist attack in court’s state. Variable OutofStateAttack
takes value of 1 if the attack happens outside of the court’s state. National news coverage is an indicator which takes value of one when the
incident is covered by any of the four national news channels CNN, ABC,
CBS, or NBC, for any number of minutes.

Column (2) of Table 2.15 investigates the heterogeneous effect due to news coverage
among the judges who are in the state of the attacks. Approximately 35 % of observations
in the treated group belong to observations exposed to national news coverage. Among the
judges in states where terrorist attacks happen, the marginal effect of terrorist attacks that
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are covered by national news is not different from zero (α1 ). In particular, the effect of newscovered terrorist attacks (α1 + β1 ) is different from zero and equal to other incidents. This
implies that incidents selected into national news coverage do not have a heterogeneous effect
on the asylum decisions of the judges in the attacks state, suggesting that the characteristics
that lead to selection into the national news are not a source of heterogeneity.
Finally, the estimation reported in the last column includes all the variables covered.
Note that the last variable (OutofStateAttack × N ationalN ews) is negative and statistically
significant. This variable takes the value of one during the sixty days after out of (court’s)
state terrorist attacks that are covered by national news. Thus, during periods of exposure to
national news coverage of terrorist attacks in other states, judges are 0.5 percentage points
(1.2 %) less likely to grant asylum compared to the times that they are not exposed to
terrorist attacks (or its news)28 . Given that national news covered incidents did not have a
heterogeneous effect on the judges in the courts’ states and they affect the judges in other
states, I conclude that information dissemination, rather than characteristics of national
news covered incidents, is the channel through which the spill-over in effects happen.
2.7. Conclusion
This essay investigates the impact of terrorist attacks on the asylum decision of
judges. Using adjudications between 2004 and 2019, the essay shows that terrorist attacks
in the state of the courts reduce the probability of granting an asylum by 1.9 percent during
the sixty days after terrorist attacks. Given that approximately 95,000 cases were decided
during the two months after an incident, nearly 1800 individuals have been denied asylum
28

I have estimated a specification in which the indicator for terrorist attacks in other states is dropped. This
does not change the magnitude and significance of the point estimate. However, it changes the interpretation
of news-covered attacks in other states to a reduction in the likelihood of granting asylum compared to the
time judges are not exposed to news of terrorist attacks in other states
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because their cases were decided after terrorist attacks. Decomposition of terrorist attacks
by the ideology of perpetrator groups indicates that Left-wing terrorist attacks do not affect
the asylum decisions. On the other hand, Islamic terrorist attacks, Right-wing terrorist
attacks, and Lone-wolf incidents cause 3.5%, 2.3%, and 1.9% reduction in the likelihood of
granting asylum, respectively. Findings of this essay are in line with the recent literature
that links Right-wing domestic terrorism with a shift in attitudes towards immigrants, and
document Left-wing terrorist attack do not impact attitudes towards immigrants (Böhmelt
et al., 2020). Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of Islamic terrorist attacks are similar
to the documented effect of 9/11 attack on asylum decisions for applicants from Muslim
majority countries (Brodeur, 2018).
An extensive body of literature has documented discrepancies among individual
judges based on their characteristics. This raises the question of which, if any, characteristics
of the judges might play a role in driving the results. Along these lines, the evidence provided in the essay indicates that terrorist attacks affect older judges and judges with higher
tenure. Given the colinearity of age and tenure, it remains inconclusive whether the judges’
age or experience (or both aspect) drives the first two findings. I show that the effects are
significant only for decisions of judges appointed by Democrat presidents. Finally, terrorist
attacks affect both male and female judges similarly and the gender of the judge has no
impact on the effect of terrorist attacks.
Analysis of the location of the attacks and national news coverage resulted in three
significant findings. First, on average, only terrorist attacks in the state of the courts affect
judges’ tendencies to grant asylum. Second, among judges judges in the state of attacks,
there is no difference in the effects between the incidents that are covered by national news
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and the rest of terrorist attacks. Third, when covered by national news channels, judges in
the states with no terrorist attack also become harsher. Given the second and third points,
information dissemination is the most likely the spill-over channel in effects. Put it differently, had the incidents selected to news coverage had different characteristics that resulted
in spill-overs, I would expect them to impact judges in the courts’ state differentially. However, results reject any differential impact of these incidents. If information dissemination
is to be a driving mechanism, the literature suggests an increase in mortality salience can
play a role in changing judges’ stringency. For example, there is evidence that mortality
salience negatively affects views on immigration issues (Pan, Zhou, & Thompson Hayes,
2017). Moreover, Tripathi (2018) suggests that the adverse effect of terrorist attacks on
attitude towards immigrants is driven by the fear of being a (potential) next victim.
Evidence from other studies motivates investigation of heterogeneity of effects due to
applicants’ nationality.29 The paper shows that terrorist attacks only affect the likelihood
of asylum grants for applicants of Latin American countries and China. On the other hand,
there is no evidence suggesting that applicants of Muslim majority countries are adversely
affected. This contrasts with the findings of part of the literature on terrorist attacks and
their discussion on the channel of effects (Brodeur & Wright, 2019). The association of Muslim identity and the potential negative effects of 9/11 have been referenced in documented
adverse effects on other groups of individuals. For instance, McConnell and Rasul (2021),
which documents the negative effect of 9/11 on Hispanic defendants in federal courts, argues
that the observed animosity against Hispanic defendants is the result of an intertwining
29

Evidence from previous studies also motivates investigation of (a change in) out-group bias in this
study. Unfortunately, data does not allow for matching judges’ identities with applicants’. In particular,
the applicant’s gender is widely missing and inconsistently recorded. Furthermore, judges’ ethnicity, race,
or heritage could not be determined.
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of concepts of “Islamophobia” and “Immigration” in the American “consciousness.” Since
both papers rely on the 9/11 incident, the settings considerably differ from the present paper. Consequently, I acknowledge that this paper’s results do not serve as a rejection of
the existence of such phenomena, especially in the face of catastrophic events such as 9/11.
Notwithstanding, I interpret the result in the current paper as a lack of evidence for consistent association of Muslim majority nationals with ”terrorist attack” phenomena, at least
in the perception of immigration judges.
The observed heterogeneity among different nationalities does not necessarily imply
an existing bias among judges. The distribution of evidence quality may depend on the applicant’s nationality. Thus, even an across-the-board increase in a judges’ optimal threshold
of evidence can result in a heterogeneous overturning of cases based on applicants’ nationalities. However, given the data limitation and institutional setting used in this paper, it is
not possible to investigate the reason for the observed heterogeneity among different nationalities. I do not observe the quality of evidence. Consequently, it is impossible to infer the
“true” state and the “right” decision. That being said, recent evidence from immigration
courts suggests that part of the finding reported in this essay, that Latin American applicants bear the effects, might be rooted in a deep-seated bias that is not necessarily relevant
to the incident of terrorism. In particular, by examining the original audio recording of the
bond hearings in immigration courts to determine how judges decide on the danger that
applicants pose to the community, (Ryo, 2019) finds that Central American applicants are
more likely to be deemed as dangerous than other applicants. However, this cannot explain why applicants from China are adversely affected. Consequently, determinants of this
heterogeneity remain to be answered in future research.
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Chapter 3. Error Corrections in Immigration Courts
3.1. Introduction
Since the Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007) highlighted the significant discrepancies in grant
rates among individual immigration judges, there has been growing attention to the role of
judge tendencies and the problem of inconsistency in asylum decisions (Keith et al., 2013a).
It is documented that the discrepancies remain significant even after considering factors such
as the humanitarian crisis in the sending countries U.S. relation with the asylum sending
countries, detention status of the applicant, whether the applicant is represented by a lawyer,
charges brought against the asylum seeker, the employment background of the immigration
judge, and the court at which the case is decided (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007; Miller et al.,
2015).
Figure 3.1 replicates the discrepancy among the individual judges within the top 20
courts between 2004 and 2019. Given the random assignment of cases to judges within
a court, the observed inconsistency among individual judges has been a source of concern
among legal scholars and immigration advocates. There is a wide range of ad-hoc policy
proposals to reduce the inconsistencies among immigration judges. These proposals include
changes such as increasing the number of immigration judges, providing cultural sensitivity
and awareness training, holding immigration judges accountable through disciplinary actions,
and making it a norm, rather than an exception, for the Board of Immigration Appeal (BIA)
to publish opinions (Vaala, 2008).
This essay aligns with the last policy proposal and investigates the impact of the
BIA’s opinions on the immigration judges’ decisions. The BIA rarely published its opinion,
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Figure 3.1. Discrepancy in Grant Rates.
with 99.9 % of its decision being made without being unpublished.1 Figure 3.1 presents the
yearly charts for the share of published and unpublished decisions by the BIA for six different
years. The lack of published decisions leaves many immigration judges, immigration lawyers,
and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) attorneys2 with little information about
the board’s preferences and legal philosophy, potentially contributing to the documented
discrepancy. It also imposes an empirical challenge to estimate potential impacts of the
board’s opinions on immigration judges.
To overcome this challenge, I exploit an institutional feature in which the BIA, rather
than reversing a decision upon finding errors, issues an opinion and remand the case to immigration courts for a new round of hearings. As a result, judges to whom the remanded
cases are assigned will receive the boards’ opinion, resulting in variations in access to the
1

Authors calculations from a hand-collected count of published opinions and immigration courts data.
Throughout the essay I use DHS, DHS attorneys, and prosecutors interchangeably to refer to the party
that is seeking the deportation of immigrants.
2
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Share of Published Decisions
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Unpublished

Unpublished
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2016
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0.08%

0.08%

0.13%

Published

Published

Published

Unpublished

Unpublished

Unpublished

99.92%

99.92%

99.87%

Figure 3.2. Share of BIA’s Published Opinions by Decision Year.
board’s opinions among immigration judges. Moreover, the backlogs of cases in the immigration courts and the BIA result in an as good as random variation in the timing of the
first hearing for the remanded case and the date that the judge renders decisions on other
cases. I find that receiving a case that is remanded in favor of prosecutors reduces judges’
leniency by 2.8 % during the fifteen days after the judge hear the remanded case for the first
time.
Understanding the implications of an appeal process within judicial systems is a
critical scientific and policy inquiry.3 The two main functions of a judicial hierarchy are error
correction and legal determinations (Drahozal, 1997; Shavell, 1995). Consequently, a growing
body of literature has studied the implication of these two functions on the behavior of judges
within different tiers of judicial hierarchy. There is evidence that by performing the lawmaking function (through setting precedents), appellate courts increase the consistency of
3

For a review of literature on judicial hierarchy and appellate courts, see (Kastellec, 2017).
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adjudications within the lower courts. For instance, among the cases filed before a precedent,
the lower courts are forty percent more likely to follow the higher courts’ decisions when the
cases are decided after the precedent is set. Moreover, the precedent following is not driven
by fear of reversal per se (Chen et al., 2017; Klein & Hume, 2003).
In contrast to law-making, the primary goal of the error correction function is not to
increase the quality of adjudications in the lower court’s decisions directly. Instead, it allows
identifying and correcting the errors in the lower courts’ judges’ decisions. (Shavell, 1995).4
The appeals process is costly, and decision reversals can have reputational consequences for
lower courts’ judges (Shavell, 1995, 2006; Baker & Kornhauser, 2015). As a result, functions such as error correction will affect the lower courts’ judges by changing the “strategic
environment” in which they make decisions (Zorn & Bowie, 2010). However, the degree
to which judges make such strategic considerations and their effects on their decisions is a
priori unknown.
The possibility of appealing a decision and the “threat” it imposes on adjudicators
can reduce deviations from socially desirable outcomes and thus increase the quality of
adjudications (Shavell, 2006). On the other hand, judges may shift their workload to the
upper tier of the hierarchy and redistribute their efforts in the face of the possibility of
error corrections by another decision-maker or, adversely, increase their effort if they have
reputational concerns (Chopard, Fain, & Roussey, 2018; Christmann, 2015; Shavell, 2006).5
Given that the BIA does not reverse the decision and remand erroneous decision to the
4

The author, however, argues that even by performing this function, error correction contributes to “the
harmonization of the law” in the long run.
5
Literature on implications of appellate review is sparse. For another example of its effects on the judicial
effort, see: (Feess & Sarel, 2018), for a theoretical framework of affecting judicial efforts see (Turner, 2017),
for a theoretical framework about implications of judicial hierarchy on the incentives of judges see (Cameron
& Kornhauser, 2005; Westerland, Segal, Epstein, Cameron, & Comparato, 2010)
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lower courts after issuing an opinion, error corrections also provide the lower court’s judges
with signals about past imprecision in decisions and as a result, they can potentially affect
accuracy of the judge decisions in other cases.6 Overall, the effects of error correction on
judges’ decision-making remains an empirical question open to investigation.
Another contribution of this essay is to fill a gap for direct evidence of the effects of
receiving error corrections in a non-experimental setting. Despite the extensive literature on
reversal aversion, most of the existing evidence is indirect. In particular, the literature on reversal aversion has mainly focused on judges’ adherence to policy preferences of upper courts
by using the upper courts’ characteristics (e.g., the share of democrat judges) that explains
the variations in decisions of the trial judges. For example, Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2012)
argues that the appellate courts’ preferences should help the district courts’ judges predict
the probability of reversals and affect their decisions. Consistent with this, they find that
district court judges have more high-quality opinions and have a higher affirmance rate when
they sit in circuits with politically uniform judges. Authors relate this to judges’ improved
ability to identify potential reversals. Within the context of immigration courts Miller et
al. (2015) argues that the board’s ideology might affect the grant rates among immigration
judges. Thus, it is expected that the more “conservative” is the board’s composition, the
lower the grant rate within immigration courts is going to be. Nonetheless, the evidence
provided by the authors is mixed, and the association between the board’s ideology and
immigration judges’ decisions is nonexistent during specific periods.7
6

For a theoretical framework that incorporates imprecision correction and ideological preferences in appellate and trial courts’ judges’ interaction see (Spitzer & Talley, 2000)
7
In particular, they argue that changes in institutional setting and reforms in the B.I.A. have declined
the need for strategic considerations (at least based on the ideology of the B.I.A.). Thus the ideological
composition of the board was relevant before the reforms took place and less important after that.
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Whether immigration judges are reversal averse or not, and the underlying mechanism
for reversal aversion is not the subject of study in this essay. Nonetheless, any evidence of
error corrections affecting the direction at which the judges make asylum decisions serves
better as suggestive evidence of reversal aversion and strategic considerations in comparison
to relying on the upper court’s composition. This is due to the fact that the appellate
court judges’ characteristics and the outcomes of the lower courts are highly endogenous.
This problem is particularly vital for quasi-judicial institutions such as U.S. immigration
courts, in which the Attorney General has complete control over the first two tiers of courts.
As a result, the appellate board members, the precedents set by the board, the hiring of
immigration judges, and even the enforcement policies adopted by the DHS would reflect the
incumbent administrations’ preferences. Consequently, distinguishing the degree to which
such correlations are due to institutional factors rather than strategic considerations by
judges is challenging.
Finally, this chapter sheds light on the consequences of interaction among two tiers of
immigration courts in the U.S, which is of policy interest for three reasons. First, immigration
courts face high backlogs at the trial and appellate tiers, which affects the costs of having
subsequent trials. For instance, among appealed cases that eventually get remanded to the
lower courts, the average distance between the date that the appeal is filed and the date of
its first hearing after the remand is 707 days, with an average of 2.5 hearings per case after
getting back to the lower court until the immigration judges render a new merit decision for
the case. As a result, the errors that result in remanded cases by the appeal board lead to
numerous additional hearings and more than two years of navigation through the courts by
the immigrants until the case is resolved.
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Second, immigration judges are not Article(III) judges, and their authority is not
driven from Article III of the Constitution. In contrast, they are “...attorneys whom the
Attorney General appoints as administrative judges...” (8 CFR §1003.10 (a)). As a result,
they have less judicial independence than Article(III) judges and are subject to different
forms of performance monitoring (Miller et al., 2015). This creates an institutional setting
different from that of federal courts in the extent of judges’ discretion, the review process,
and the “strategic environment” for the judges that warrants its own investigation. Finally,
the substantial documented inconsistency among individual judges’ asylum decision and the
low number of published decisions by the appellate board suggest imply that there is a room
for increasing by providing more guidelines, the BIA might be able to reduce inconsistencies.
The current study is based on an analysis of more than 380,000 asylum decisions and
22,000 remanded cases that the judges heard between 2004 and 2019. This exclusive data
set was obtained from the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), the division of
the Department of Justice, which is in charge of both immigration courts and the board of
immigration appeal. I find that, on average, hearing a case that is remanded in favor of
D.H.S.’s attorneys reduces the likelihood of granting asylum by 2.8 %.
To further understand the potential driving mechanism, I have complimented the
immigration courts’ data with administrative data on the board-member votes to identify
information regarding the ideology of the board members who issued the remand decision.
This analysis reveals that reversals in favor of prosecutors affect the judges’ decisions when
Democrat-appointed appellate board members issue them. In particular, judges are four
percent less likely to grant asylum during the fifteen days after receiving a case where
a Democrat panel has a side with the D.H.S.’s attorneys. The sign for point estimates
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of the effect of prosecutor favoring remands by Republican board members is negative,
and magnitude is slightly smaller, albeit statistically indistinguishable from zero across all
specifications.
To understand whether the judges’ tendencies change due to an increase in their decision accuracy, or they change due to strategic considerations that are unrelated to receiving
an interpretation about a past errors, I focus on the appealing behavior of immigrants and
prosecutors. Cases that are decided after a judge hears remanded appeals in favor of prosecutors are less likely to be appealed by the losing party. In particular, immigrants are 3%
less likely to appeal rejected asylums, and prosecutors are 25% less likely to appeal granted
asylums after judges receive remanded cases in favor of prosecutors. This suggests that an
increase in the accuracy of judges’ decisions (as perceived by the losing party) is a potential
channel through which receiving remanded cases affect judges’ decisions.
3.2. Institutional Setting
3.2.1. Asylum Application in U.S.
For a description of asylum application in the U.S., please refer to Subsection 2.2.1.
3.2.2. Administrative Branches in the Asylum Process
For a description of the administrative branches involved in asylum process and institutional changes in them, please refer to Subsection 2.2.2.
3.2.3. Appeal Process and The Board of Immigration Appeals
Applicants who are not satisfied with the proceeding’s outcome have the right to
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), another institutional component of the
immigration system within the Department of Justice (DOJ). The appeal must be filed no
later than thirty calendar days after the immigration judges’ order (8 C.F.R. §1003.38(b)).
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The board is located in Falls Church, Virginia, and as of April 2021, it consists of 23
administrative judges appointed by the Attorney General (AG) of the United States.8
Currently, the primary format of BIA decision-making is through single-member decisions. However, this results from a series of reforms in the board’s functioning to reduce
its backlog. Before these reforms, panel decisions were the primary form of reviewing cases.
Followed by the increased backlogs, a series of reforms were initiated by AG Reno in 1999
and expanded by AG Ashcroft in 2002 changing the BIA’s decision-making scope. As a
result of these changes, individual decisions are the dominant mean of adjudication for most
cases. Reforms also ended the board review of facts, requiring the board to “defer to immigration judges unless a decision is erroneous” (Miller et al., 2015). Thus, the standard of
appellate review for immigration judges’ decisions is reasonableness and the board review
cases for clear errors. If applicants are not satisfied with the board’s decision, they may
seek judicial review of the final agency decisions by going to the appropriate federal circuit
courts(Legomsky, 2010).
As Miller et al. (2015) argues, these changes have implications on the strategic environment in which judges make decisions and impact their expectations of reversals, probability of (getting) appealed, and consequently how they react when receiving reversed errors.
Accordingly, the streamlining reforms of the BIA and post 9/11 reforms in the enforcement
and prosecution functions in 20039 call for focusing on a consistent institutional setting,
which is achieved by limiting the sample to post 2004 decisions.
8

The creation of the board results from an AG directive, and it was placed in the DOJ during 1983. See
(Miller et al., 2015) for more details regarding the history and changes.
9
See Subsection 2.2 of this dissertation for a discussion of the reforms.
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3.3. Data and Summary Statistics
The comprehensive data on the immigration courts is acquired from the website of
the EOIR.10 The data set contains information about cases, all the proceedings of a case, the
applications for reliefs, motions, and appeals. I use this source to identify asylum cases and
their outcomes, together with the information on appealed asylum cases and the first hearing
date for a remanded appeal. The appeal table in this dataset provides information about
the appellate court’s decision, however, it does not identify the identity(ies) of the board
member(s) who made the decision. As a result, I rely on administrative data of the Board
of Immigration Appeals votes that I acquired through a FOIA request from the EOIR to
complement the publicly available data with additional information. In particular, I use the
administrative data to distinguish the political party of the appellate board who remanded
each appeal.
I focus on the first on the merit decisions to exclude decisions that are made after an
error correction for a case. This way, I can estimate the effect of receiving remanded cases
on entirely separate cases. Between 2004 and 2019, there were 410,168 first on the merit
asylum decisions for cases in removal proceedings.11 Out of these, there are 6,347 in absentia
decisions, instances in which the applicants miss the hearing and the judge renders a decision
on the application. Almost all of these instances result in rejection (99 %), and I exclude
them from the sample. Furthermore, I exclude cases that have stipulated order of removal,
case that the DHS has terminated them, and cases in the Puerto Rico court (involve less
than 0.01 percent of cases). This leaves me with 403,542 observations. In addition, I require
10

https://www.justice.gov/eoir
Note that this number is higher than the sample reported in Subsection 2.3.1 since I exploit all courts,
rather than those in a state with a terrorist attack.
11
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a judge to have decided more than nine asylum applications and a country to have had
more than 99 decided applications to be included in the sample. This reduces the number of
observations to 400,947 observations. Finally, I exclude judges who never hear any remanded
appeals in the primary analysis. The remaining sample, used in the main analysis, involves
380,034 first on the merit asylum decisions made by 520 judges.12
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for the sample of the study. The mean
dependent variable is 42 %. This increases to 46 % if I redefine the resolution as the grant
of any of the three applications for these cases. Forty-two percent of the applications were
filed affirmatively, and the rest were initiated after being charged by the DHS. Seventeen
percent of the cases belong to detained applicants. Seven percent of the cases have criminal
charges, and a lawyer represented ninety percent of applicants.
I relied on the appeals dataset to calculate the independent variables of interest. In
total, 29,532 asylum appeals that resulted in remands were matched with the administrative
vote data. Out of these, I excluded 13 appeals that belong to proceedings that have no denial
or grant of a relief and end in administrative decisions. Moreover, I exclude subsequent
appeals for the same case (2,780 appeals). This way, I focus on the appeals for first on the
merit decisions of a case. Between the remaining (26,739) appeals, 24,111 have an identified
subsequent proceeding with a non-missing hearing date that can be used to determine the
day a judge hears the remanded case for the first time.
Among these remanded appeals, 20,586 are instances that have a post-remand hearing during Dec. 2003 and Jan 2020. These appeals effectively contribute to calculating
independent variables of interest in the study sample. Figures 3.3, B.1, and B.2 show the
12

I add the excluded judges and countries back as robustness checks.
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of The Court Data
Variable

Mean
(Sd)

Definition:

Dependent Variable:
Asylum Grant

Equals 1 if the asylum application is granted and 0 if denied

0.42
(0.49)

Case Characteristics:
Affirmative Applications

Equals 1 if the application was initiated affirmatively.

Lawyer

Equals 1 if the applicant is represented during the proceeding

Detained

Equals 1 if the applicant is detained during the proceeding

Criminal Charge

Equal 1 if the applicant have criminal charges by the DHS

0.41
(0.49)
0.90
(0.30)
0.17
(0.38)
0.07
(0.26)

Variables of Interest:

Indicators of hearing a remanded case in the past 15 days:

RemandA
st−15

Equals 1 if the case was remanded in favor of an Applicant.

RemandP
st−15

Equals 1 if the case was remanded in favor of DHS attorneys.

N=

0.15
(0.36)
0.03
(0.17)
380,034

Notes : The sample is restricted to all the initial merit adjudications for asylum applications in removal
proceedings decided between Jan. 1,2004 and Dec. 31, 2019.

within judge distribution of months with remanded hearings by the party who filed the
appeals and the political party of the appellate board issuing the remand decisions.
For the appeals that result in error corrections, the average distance between the date
that a judge made the initial decision to the day BIA makes a remand decision is 556 days.
Moreover, the average distance between the board’s decision date and the first hearing for
the remanded case is 148 days.13 On average, it takes more than two years for an appealed
case to have another hearing in front of a judge (conditional on being remanded).
Using the dates of the first hearing for these instances, I define two indicators as
independent variables of interest. First, RemandA
st−15 , which takes the value of 1 if the judge
13
While the decision for the remanded cases are not included in the sample, it is noteworthy that the
average distance between the first hearing and the day the judge renders a decision on the remanded case
is 304 days. This further confirm that the backlogs result in as-good-as random timing for the hearings of
these cases and decision on other asylum cases.
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Figure 3.3. Within Judge Distribution of Months with Hearings for Remanded Cases.
Note: Each point on the Y-axis represent an individual judge. Shaded areas in the figures plot the duration
in which a judge makes asylum decisions in the sample. Red markers in the Left figure plots the months in
which each judge has had at least one hearing for a case remanded by the Board of Immigration Appeals
in favor of prosecutors and figure on the right plot the hearings for remanded cases in favor of immigrants.

has heard any case that has been remanded in favor of applicant (A) during the past 15
days. Similarly, RemandPst−15 takes the value of 1 if the judge has heard any case remanded
in favor of the prosecutor (P) during the past 15 days. Overall, effects are short-lived and
are sensitive to specification for more extended time windows. On average, fifteen percent of
cases are decided during the 15 days after hearing a remanded case in favor of immigrants.
The mean value of RemandPst−15 indicates that three percent of asylum applications are
decided during the fifteen days after hearing reversals in favor of the DHS.
Appeals do not necessarily get assigned to the same judge. Among the contributing
appeals, 72 % of them result in instances that the same judge hears the case again, and a
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new judge hears the rest. However, given the low number of observations in which a judge
hears remanded appeals (in favor of DHS) of other judges (1,408 observations), heterogeneity
analysis along this aspect of appeals is inconclusive. For this paper, I have relied on both
types of remanded cases (judge’s case Vs. other judges’ case) since they both represent a
situation of receiving an error correction and provide the judge with private information on
the opinion of the appeal board about an issue.
3.4. Empirical Specification
I estimate the following linear probability model:
P
Ajact = α + β1 × RemandA
st−15 + β2 × Remandst−15 + Xa + γj + ηc + δt + γj × t + ϵjact (3.1)

where Ajact is the adjudication made by judge j, in the court c, at time t for the applicant’s
a asylum application, and it takes the value of 1 if the application is granted and zero
P
otherwise. Key independent variables, RemandA
st−15 and Remandst−15 , are indicators of

hearings of a remanded case in favor of the applicants and DHS’s attorneys during the past
15 days, respectively. Vector of time-invariant case characteristics is represented by Xa . It
includes indicators for affirmative asylum application, an indicator of representation by a
lawyer, an indicator determining whether the applicant has been detained during the trials,
an indicator of criminal charges, and finally, nationality of applicants’ fixed effects. Judge
fixed effects are represented by γj , while ηc is court fixed effects, and δt denotes time fixed
effects, respectively. The term γj × t represents judge-specific trends which are included
to absorb possible linear changes in unobservable judge characteristics (judges’ tendencies),
and ϵjact is the error term. The identifying assumption needed for a causal interpretation
is that conditional on controlling for the relevant observable characteristics, time-varying
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unobservable factors that affect the outcomes of cases are not systematically related to
hearing dates for remanded cases.
There are two institutional arguments supporting the randomness assumption. First,
cases within immigration courts are randomly assigned to the judges based on the first
available calendar. Second, the immigration courts and the board of immigration face high
backlogs of cases which leads to an arbitrarily long distance between the date that the
remanded case and other decided cases were opened initially.14 For instance, figure 3.4 plots
the average number of days it takes the BIA to issue a remand decision and the average
number of days it takes the remanded case to be heard again in the lower court for each
month that appeals were filed. The blue line (circle) is the average total turnover time since
an appeal is filed. In this sense, the variations in the orange line (triangle) and green line
(square) reflect how much of the variation in the total turnover time is coming from the
board’s backlog and the immigration court’s backlogs, respectively.
Nonetheless, even a random assignment would not factor out all possible confounders.
For instance, any event that causes an increase in judges’ harshness also increases the number
of appeals they receive from applicants, and everything else held constant, this translates
into an increase in the number of hearings for remanded cases in favor of applicants later (for
the judge and his peers in the courthouse if the case does not get reassigned to him). In this
case, the increase in judge harshness would exhibit itself through a declining likelihood of
grant for upcoming cases, which would coincide with hearing more remanded hearings. This
type of confounder calls for controlling for judge-specific trends and judge and court-fixed
effects, which are included in all specifications.
14

Recall that the average distance is longer than two years.

63

Figure 3.4. Average Number of Days to Process Remanded Appeals By
Month of Filing.
Note: Figure plots average number of days for BIA to make the remand decision on
appeals (hollow triangle), and average number of days it takes for the remanded case
to be heard in front of a judge after that (hollow square) calculated for months that
appeals were filed. The line with hollow circle is the total turnover time, which is equal
to summation of these two averages.

Before providing the main results, I formally examine the randomness assumption
by regressing the independent variables of interest on a relevant case characteristic while
controlling for judge, year, and the court fixed effects and judge-specific trends. Table 3.2
reports results for these estimations. All the standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
Each cell in Table 3.2 represent a separate regression of the dependent variable as noted on
the top of the Column on the case characteristic.
Several comments are warranted. First, as the number of regression increases, the
possibility of false positives increases as well, and it is expected that some of the point
estimates turn out significant. This might explain the marginal significance of the affirma-
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Table 3.2. Randomness Tests
Coefficient
(S.E.)
Dependent Variable:

RemandA
st−15

RemandP
st−15

0.007***
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.03)
0.000
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.003)

0.002
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.004***
(0.001)

0.03
380,034

0.03
380,034

Affirmative Application
Lawyer
Detained
Criminal Charge

Joint Significance (p-value) :
N=

Notes : Each cell represent a separate regression of the indicator of hearings of remanded cases in favor of applicant (A) or
Prosecutors (P), during the past fifteen days regressed on a case
characteristic. The dependent variable for regression reported
in first column is an indicator for hearing cases remanded in favor of Applicants, and in the second column is an indicator for
hearing cases remanded in favor of Prosecutors. All regressions
control for judge, court, and year fixed effects and judge-specific
linear trends. Standard errors, clustered at the judge level are
reported in parenthesis.

tive application indicator in predicting hearing a remanded case in favor of the applicants.
Second, the p-value for the joint significance test (reported at the bottom) indicates that
coefficients are jointly significant for the applicants’ remands indicator. Affirmative applications have a substantially higher likelihood of receiving asylum than defensive applications
(60% vs. 28%). As a result, cases decided after receiving a remand in favor of immigrants
have a higher chance of receiving asylum due to their composition. While all specifications
control the type of asylum application, this would undermine any result indicating that
receiving remanded cases in favor of applicants increases judges’ tendency to grant asylums.
Finally, the coefficient on the indicator of criminal charge is robustly significant and
indicates a negative correlation with the indicator of hearing cases remanded in favor of
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prosecutors. However, cases with criminal charges are less likely to receive asylum, which
suggests that the composition of asylum cases after receiving a pro-prosecutor remand are
less likely to involve criminal charges. As a result, they are expected to have a higher
likelihood of grants. However, the main finding of the current study is that receiving these
remands reduces the leniency of judges, and cases decided after pro-prosecutor remands
have a lower likelihood of receiving asylum. Consequently, the results provided in this paper
should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates of the effect of error corrections in favor of
prosecutors on immigration judges’ asylum.
3.4.1. Results
Table 3.3 reports the results for baseline estimates. All of the reported standard
errors are clustered at the judge level. Specification reported in the first column does not
include any case-specific fixed effects. Specification reported in the second column includes a
set of dummies to control for several time-invariant case characteristics. Column (3) reports
a specification that adds a set of dummies for the day of the week that the decision is made.
Column (4) reports the specification of interest, which includes decision date fixed effects.
Finally, the specification reported in column 5 uses judge-by-year fixed effects rather than
judge-specific trends.
Overall, results reported in Table 2.3 indicate that when judges receive a case remanded in favor of prosecutors, they become less likely (3 % reduction in likelihood for the
benchmark model reported in Column (4)) to grant asylum for a short time. The point
estimates for the indicator of receiving cases remanded in favor of immigrants are smaller in
magnitude, opposite in sign, and never statistically significant.
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Table 3.3. Effect of Error Corrections on Asylum Decisions
Dependent Variable: Asylum Grant

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.004
(0.003)
-0.008*
(0.005)

0.003
(0.002)
-0.010**
(0.005)

0.003
(0.002)
-0.010**
(0.005)

0.003
(0.002)
-0.012***
(0.005)

0.004
(0.003)
-0.010**
(0.005)

Case Level FE
Court FE

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Judge FE
Judge Specific Trend
Judge by Year FE

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes

Year FE
Decision Date FE
Month of Year FE
Day of Week FE

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
No
No

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

RemandA
st−15 (1)
RemandP
st−15 (α2 )

Mean Dependent Variable:
N=

Notes : Dependent variable is a dichotomous variable taking value of 1 if asylum application
is granted and 0 if it is denied. RemandA
st−15 takes value of one if the judge has received
a cases that was remanded in favor of applicant during the past fifteen days. Similarly,
RemandA
st−15 takes value of one if the judge has received a case remanded in favor of the
prosecutors during the past 15 days. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors clustered
at the judge level. Sample includes all initial merit decisions between Jan. 1,2004 and Dec.
31, 2019 for asylum applications.

3.4.2. Robustness of Results
I implemented several analyses to investigate the robustness of the results. Results
of these analyses are reported in Table2.5.
The first column of Table 3.4 reports the result of an estimation that uses an alternative dependent variable. Recall that an asylum applicant can simultaneously apply
for less beneficial, temporary reliefs (withholding of removal and CAT, see Subsection 2.2)
that would protect them from immediate deportations. Replacing the dependent variable
with an indicator that takes the value of one if any of these applications is granted would
increase the mean dependent variable to 0.46. Results are robust to using the alternative
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Table 3.4. Robustness of Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.004
(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.005)

0.004
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.005)

0.004*
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.005)

0.001
(0.003)
-0.009*
(0.005)

Case Level FE
Court FE

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Judge FE
Judge Specific Trend

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Year FE
Decision Date FE

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

0.42
380,034

0.42
331,985

0.42
403,542

0.42
380,034

RemandA
st−15 (1)
RemandP
st−15 (α2 )

Mean Dep. Variable:
N=

Notes : Table provides robustness checks. Column (1) reports point
estimates of a regression that replaces dependent variable (resolution
of asylum application) with an indicator of grant of any of the three
possible relief application (Asylum, Withholding, and CAT). Specification reported in Column (2) restrict the sample to post Real-ID
act (decisiondate > May,11,2005). Column (3) reports a sample that
add the judges with less than 10 observations and countries with less
than 100 observations, and judges with no hearings for remanded asylum appeals to the benchmark, and Column (4) report a specification
that replaces judge specific trends with court-by-year fixed effects.

outcome as the dependent variable. Second, Miller et al. (2015) argues that passage of the
Real ID Act reduces the likelihood of appealing by applicants since it adds to the judges’
discretion in credibility determinations and provides them with the possibility of requiring
corroborating evidence (8 U.S.C §1229a(c)(4)(B)). This can affect the systemic environment
in which immigration judges make decisions, particularly the perceived possibility of reversals and its effect on judges’ decision-making. To test the sensitivity of results to the change
in law, I focus on a sample that excludes cases decided before the Real ID Act’s restrictions
for asylum applications were commanded. As reported in Column (2), point-estimate are
almost identical for this sample of cases. Third, remember that I excluded judges who decide
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less than ten asylum adjudication, nationalities with less than a hundred asylum decisions,
and judges who never heard a remanded asylum appeal (between 2004 and 2019) from the
primary sample. Column (3) reports the point estimate of a regression using a sample that
includes the previously excluded observations. Doing so marginally increases the sample
size, but the point estimates are identical to the benchmark sample.
Finally, the main specification included judge-specific trends to control for trends in
unobservable judge tendency that would affect the number of remanded cases they receive
later and the probability of granting asylum. Another unobservable factor that can affect
both the number of remanded hearings and the probability of grants is the behavior of
prosecutors. Since that regional office of DHS assigns cases of particular courts to specific
groups of DHS attorneys within the area, I can reduce the impact of such unobservables by
controlling for court-by-year fixed effects. Column (4) reports the results of a specification
that includes court-by-year fixed effects. This reduces the magnitude of the effect of receiving
DHS favoring remands to one percentage point. Moreover, the point estimate for the effect of
receiving pro-immigrant remands is sensitive to this change and loses its significance together
with a sizable reduction in its magnitude. This is potentially due to the high number of
appealed cases by immigrants, which makes receiving remanded cases in favor of immigrants
highly prevalent, and as a result, the variations in this variable within a court at any given
year are low.
3.4.3. Heterogenous Time Effects and Parallel Trends
A required assumption for identification is the parallel trends. In order to investigate
the validity of this assumption, I estimate the coefficients for a series of leads and lags for the
indicator of remand hearings. Moreover, in the main specification, the indicators determine
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the existence of a hearing within the past fifteen days. By including various lagged indicators,
I also check whether the effects are significant for decisions beyond the fifteen-day distance
used in the main table. To summarize, I estimate the following linear probability model:

Ajact = α +

4
X

βn × Remandst−n + Xa + γj + ηc + δt + γj × t + ϵjact

(3.2)

−2

where Remandst−n are a set of dummy variables determining whether the hearing leads
or lags the decision date in units of 15-days. For example, Remandst−2 takes the value
of 1 when the judge has had a hearing for a remanded case between 31 days to 45 days
before her decision on another case. In this sense, Remandst−0 would be the independent
variable of interest reported so far in the paper. Similarly, Remandst+1 and Remandst+2
will indicate times when a hearing for remanded case leads to the decision date, and they
capture possible anticipatory effects. Finally, point estimates for the effect of cases remanded
in favor of immigrants and prosecutors are estimated using two separate regressions.
Figure 3.5 graphs the point estimate for leads and lag coefficient of remand hearings
in favor of applicants and DHS separately. In the case of hearing cases that are remanded
in favor of immigrants, none of the point estimates are different from zero. The coefficients
of lead and lags for hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases confirm the main table results.
Hearing a case remanded in favor of prosecutors reduces the judge’s tendency to grant
asylum to other cases he decides for a short period. There is no evidence supporting that
the effects last longer, and none of the anticipatory effects are different from zero, supporting
the parallel trends assumption.
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Figure 3.5. Heterogenous Time Effects and Parallel Trends.
Note: Figure plots the point estimates for of a series of leads and lags on the indicator
of hearing remanded cases in favor of prosecutors and immigrants. Specification used
for estimation is explained in equation 3.2.

3.5. Unbundling the Effects
Existing literature on reversal aversion and systematic considerations indicate that
trial judges consider the preferences of the appellate court’s judge (Choi et al., 2012). To
investigate this, I distinguished the remanded cases by the political party of the appellate
board who issued the decision. I define a Democrat (Republican) board as either a single
member decision made by a board member who was appointed during a Democrat (Republican) president’s term or a three-member decision in which at least two of the members are
judges appointed during a Democrat (Republican) president’s term. Table 3.5 reports the
results for this investigation. Variables of interest are a set of indicators that take the value
of one when the judge has received a case that has been remanded in favor of applicant (A)
or DHS (P) by Republican or Democrat boards during the past fifteen days.
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Table 3.5. Unbundling the Effects: Appeal Board’s Political Affiliation
Dependent Variable: Asylum Grant

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.001
(0.003)
0.004*
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.013**
(0.06)

0.001
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.014**
(0.06)

0.001
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.006)
-0.015***
(0.006)

0.001
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.017***
(0.006)

0.002
(0.003)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.019***
(0.006)

Case Level FE
Court FE

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Judge FE
Judge Specific Trend
Judge by Year FE

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

No
No
Yes

Year FE
Decision Date FE
Month of Year FE
Day of Week FE

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
No
No

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

0.42
380,034

Republican RemandA
st−15 (α1 )
Democrat RemandA
st−15 (α2 )
RepublicanR emandP
st−15 (β1 )
Democrat RemandP
st−15 (β2 )

Mean Dependent Variable:
N=

Note: Republican RemandA
st−15 takes value of one if the judge has received a cases that was
remanded by republican board members in favor of applicant during the past fifteen days. Similarly, RepublicanR emandP
st−15 takes value of one if the judge has received a case remanded by
Republican board members in favor of the prosecutors during the past 15 days. Numbers in
parenthesis are standard errors clustered at the judge level.

Results imply that the judges’ decisions are impacted by receiving remanded in favor
of prosecutors only if Democrat boards have issued the remand decision. However, the sign
of point estimates for cases remanded in favor of prosecutors by Republican boards follows
the same pattern, albeit the magnitude being smaller and the coefficients not statistically
significant. This raises the concern that the lack of statistical power might be due to the
infrequency of such remand hearings.
Table 3.6 report the tabulation of remanded cases by the political party of the appellate board and the party which the decision favored. Numbers in parenthesis report the
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number of decisions in the study sample, which decided after each type of hearing. The
number of remanded cases in favor of the DHS issued by Democrat and Republican boards
and the number of asylum decisions made while exposed to each type of hearing is not different, and as a result, the lack of statistical power is unlikely to be due to insufficiency of
observations.
Table 3.6. Frequency of Remanded Cases by Appealing Party
and Board’s Political Affiliation
Remand Issued BY:
In Favor of Immigrant
In Favor of DHS
Total:

Democrat Board

Republican Board

11,426
(36,490)
1,639
(6,621)
13,065

8,547
(28,247)
1,608
(6,277)
10,155

Total:
19,973
(64,737)
3,247
(12,891)
23,220

Note: Table reports the tabulation of remanded cases by the political party
of the appellate board who issued the decision. Number in parenthesis are
the number of decision in the study sample (Total N = 380,034) that are
decided after hearing each type of remanded case.

The association between the documented effects and ideological affiliation of the
upper court does not mean that the change in grant tendency stems from a purely strategic
consideration by immigration judges. In particular, the appellate court’s behavior, how they
draft their decision, the behavior of the appealing party, and the underlying issues within
each appeal are unobserved. Theoretical models of interaction between trial and appellate
courts have also pointed out that ideological bias is only one factor that determines the
auditing behavior of appellate judges and that imprecision of trial judges’ decisions can be
a dominant reason for the appellate judges auditing and decision-making strategy (Spitzer
& Talley, 2000).
While whether a case is truly deserving and eligible for asylum is not observable,
change in the perceived error by the losing party is a proxy to the changes in judges’ decision
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accuracy. As a result, I define two new dependent variables, namely an indicator of appeal
by the DHS and an indicator of appeal by the immigrants, and use them as independent
variables in a news set of regressions to to estimate the effect hearing remanded cases on the
appealing behavior of the losing party. I do this by running the regressions separately for
the sample of rejected and granted asylum, respectively. Table 3.7 reports the result of this
investigation.
Table 3.7. Effect of Error Correction on Tendency to Appeal
Dependent Variable is an
indicator for:

Applicant Appeal

Prosecutor Appeal

Sample:

Denied Asylums

Granted Asylums

(1)

(2)

0.001
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.009)

0.000
(0.001)
-0.005**
(0.002)

N=

214,538

154,658

Mean Dependent Variable:

0.57

0.02

RemandA
st−15
RemandP
st−15

Note: Column (1) reports a regression of an indicator for applicant’s appealing a case on the full set of control used in benchmark specification.
Column (2) uses indicator of DHS appeal as the dependent variable.
Samples used in these regressions is limited to denied asylums for the
results reported in column (1) and to granted asylums for the results reported in column (2). RemandA
st−15 takes value of one if the judge has
received a cases that was remanded in favor of applicant during the past
fifteen days. Similarly, RemandA
st−15 takes value of one if the judge has
received a case remanded in favor of the prosecutors during the past 15
days. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors clustered at the judge
level. Sample includes all initial merit decisions between Jan. 1,2004
and Dec. 31, 2019 for asylum applications.

Results reported in the first column of Table 3.7 suggest that among the denied
asylums, applicants are two p.p less likely to appeal when the judge decides the case during
the two weeks after hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases. Similarly, results of the second
column indicate that prosecutors are 0.5 p.p less likely to appeal when the judge has decided
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the case after hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases between the granted asylums. Given
that the average appeal rate for prosecutors is two percent among the granted asylums, this
translates into a 25% reduction in the likelihood of DHS appealing the case. Reported results
strongly suggest that the losing party is less likely to appeal when judges make decisions
after hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases. Such a change in perceived errors suggests
that the signals received from the appellate court affect the judges’ imprecision in rendering
asylum decisions, and increased accuracy is the potential channel of effects, rather than a
change in judge tendency due to purely strategic considerations.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of receiving a direct signal of prior errors from the
upper court on the decisions of lower courts’ judges. I find that judges get stringent when
they receive cases that are remanded in favor of the prosecutors and that receiving cases
reversed in favor of immigrants have no effect on their decisions. To investigate potential
channels through which receiving the board opinions can affect asylum decisions, I focus
on the appealing behavior of immigrants and prosecutors. Cases that are decided after a
judge hears remanded appeals in favor of prosecutors are less likely to be appealed by the
losing party. In particular, immigrants are 3.5 % less likely to appeal rejected asylums, and
prosecutors are 25% less likely to appeal granted asylums after judges receive remanded
cases in favor of prosecutors.
There are several explanations for the larger response to receiving cases remanded
in favor of the government. First, the appealing behavior of prosecutors might differ from
the immigrants’ attorneys, resulting in a systematic difference in the remanded cases. For
instance, while DHS attorneys only appeal two percent of granted asylums, they have a
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very high success rate. On average, 68 % of prosecutor’s appeals get remanded to the
lower courts again. On the other hand, immigrants are highly likely to appeal a rejected
asylum (57 % appeal rates), yet they succeed only in 14 % of these appeals. This suggests
that the prosecutors are more selective in the cases that they appeal. Consequently, the
underlying issues with these cases and the resulting written opinion by the board might
differ systematically.
Another explanation rely on the fact that the success rate among the DHS appeals
is significantly high (68%). While judges, on average, might not be concerned about prosecutors appealing a case (recall that appeal rate is 2% for prosecutors), the marginal value
of the information they receive about prosecutors’ arguments in appeals is high. Put it
differently, when judges are facing cases with similar issues to past erroneous grant (conditional expectation of DHS appealing being high), the marginal benefit of avoiding errors
that lead to DHS appeals are high due to the substantial success rate of those appeals. In
contrast, appealing a denied application is a strategically beneficial move by the immigrants,
and as a result carries lower informational value for the judges. This is because appealing
a denied application give the immigrants the possibility to stay in the U.S. until the appeal
is resolved, which partially explains the substantially high appeal rates among immigrants
facing deportations.
Finally, a potential explanation is the weight that judges’ put on the information they
receive through the board’s opinions in updating their priors. For instance, when judges
hears remanded cases that they perceived unexpected to be remanded, they would put a
higher weight on the new information in updating their priors. Such narrative is also in line
with the existing literature on non-bayesian updating of beliefs in which the decision-makers
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exaggerate the value of underestimated outcomes (Ortoleva, 2012; De Filippis, Guarino,
Jehiel, & Kitagawa, 2022; Cheng, 2021). Since this channel depends on the judge-specific
expected distribution of appeal and remand rates, it is impossible to investigate whether
judges underestimate the probability of an event or not. Distribution of all remanded cases,
however, suggest that the chance of immigrants winning an appeal and getting a remand is
much lower, and as a result these instances should be deemed unexpected by the judges .
However, for non-experimental settings in which the agents rely on subjective probability,
cognitive biases may result in an under evaluation of the probability of an event. A potential
bias can happen through availability heuristics, resulting in the agent (judges) undermining
the probability of the infrequent events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The data suggest
that there is a notable difference in the frequency of hearing cases remanded in favor of
immigrants compared to prosecutors (see Figure 3.3). In this case, availability bias can
result in underestimation of the likelihood of the board favoring prosecutors. As a result,
judges might put extra weight on the signals of prior false grants upon receiving them.
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Chapter 4. Conclusion
4.1. Terrorist Attack and Asylum Decisions of the Judges
In this chapter, I use the data from U.S. immigration courts and the Global Terrorism
Dataset to investigate the causal impact of terrorist attacks on asylum decisions. I find that
terrorist attacks in the state of the courts reduce the likelihood of granting an asylum by
1.9 percent during the sixty days after terrorist attacks. Decomposing the effect by the
ideology of the terrorist groups reveals that Left-wing terrorist attacks does not affect the
asylum decisions. On the other hand, Islamic terrorist attacks, Right-wing terrorist attacks,
and Lone-wolf incidents cause 3.5%, 2.3%, and 1.9% reduction in the likelihood of granting
asylum respectively. This suggest that both transnational and domestic terrorist attacks
affect the asylum decisions.
Analysis of national news coverage and location of incidents indicate that, on average,
only terrorist attacks in the state of the courts affect judges’ tendencies to grant asylum.
Moreover, among the judges in the attacked states, there is no difference in the effects
between the incidents that are covered by national news and the rest of terrorist attacks.
Finally, attacks that are covered by national news channels reduce the likelihood of granting
asylum among judges in the states with no terrorist attack. Given that results reject any
differential impact of incidents selected into national news coverage (among judges in the
attacked state), the underlying mechanism for the spill-over is more likely to be information
dissemination.
The chapter shows that terrorist attacks only affect the likelihood of asylum grants
for applicants of Latin American countries and China. On the other hand, there is no evidence suggesting that applicants of Muslim majority countries are adversely affected. This
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contrasts with the findings of part of the literature on terrorist attacks and their discussion
on the channel of effects (Brodeur & Wright, 2019). The association of Muslim identity and
the potential negative effects of 9/11 have been referenced in documented adverse effects
on other groups of individuals. For instance, McConnell and Rasul (2021), which documents the negative effect of 9/11 on Hispanic defendants in federal courts, argues that the
observed animosity against Hispanic defendants is the result of an intertwining of concepts
of “Islamophobia” and “Immigration” in the American “consciousness.” Since both papers
rely on the 9/11 incident (and focus on a short window of time around the incident), the
settings considerably differ from the present paper. Consequently, I acknowledge that this
chapter’s results do not serve as a rejection of the existence of such phenomena, especially in
the face of catastrophic events such as 9/11. Notwithstanding, I interpret the result in the
current paper as a lack of evidence for consistent association of Muslim majority nationals
with ”terrorist attack” phenomena, at least in the perception of immigration judges.
4.2. Error Corrections in Immigration Courts
This chapter investigates the effect of receiving a direct signal of prior errors from the
upper court on the decisions of lower courts’ judges. I find that judges get stringent when
they receive cases that are remanded in favor of the prosecutors and that receiving cases
reversed in favor of immigrants have no effect on their decisions. Motivated by an extensive
body of literature linking “strategic” considerations and reversal aversion, I investigate the
ideology of board members as a source of heterogeneity. Analysis of the board members’
political parties revealed that judges’ decisions are only impacted when Democrat boards
remand a case. Judges are four percent less likely to grant asylum during the fifteen days
after hearing a case that a Democrat board remanded in favor of prosecutors. The magnitude
79

of effects for when Republican boards remand in favor of prosecutors is smaller (2.5 percent)
and never statistically significant.
To examine whether receiving the board’s opinion about past errors affect the accuracy of decisions and result in the observed stringency I focus on two new dependent
variables, namely an indicator of appeal by the DHS and an indicator of appeal by the
immigrants. Results of this investigation suggest that among the denied asylums, applicants are 2 p.p less likely to appeal when the judge decides the case during the two weeks
after hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases. Similarly, prosecutors are 0.5 p.p less likely
to appeal when the judge has decided the case after hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases
between the granted asylums. Given that the average appeal rate for prosecutors is two
percent among the granted asylums, this translates into a 25% reduction in the likelihood
of DHS appealing the case. Reported results strongly suggest that the losing party is less
likely to appeal when judges make decisions after hearing pro-prosecutor remanded cases. To
the degree that a change in perceived errors by the losing party proxies the accuracy of the
decision, this suggests that the opinions received from the appellate court affect the judges’
imprecision in rendering asylum decisions, and increased accuracy is the potential channel
of effects in contrast to change in judge tendency due to purely strategic considerations.
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Appendix A. Supplementary Figures and Tables for Chapter 2
Table A.1. Terrorist Incidents By Category of Perpetrators
Right-Wing
Group Name
Anti-Muslim Extremist
White Supermacists/Nationalist
Anti-Abortion Extremist
Anti-Semitic Extremist
Anti-Government Extremist
Pro-Trump Extremist
Neo-Nazi Extremist
Anti-LGBT
Incel Extremist
Conspiracy Theorist Extremist
Male Supermacist
Ku Klux Klan
Sovereign Citizen
Veterans United for
Non-Religious Memorials
White Rabbit Three Percent Illinois
Patriot Freedom Fighters Militia
Anti-Arab Extremist
Anti-Gun Control Extremist
Anti-Immigrant Extremist
Anti-Liberal Extremist
Anti-Sikh Extremist
Citizens for Constitutional Freedom
Minutemen American Defense
United Aryan Empire
United Consitutional Patriots
N(Total)

N(Incidents)
38
31
19
16
12
11
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2

Left-Wing
Group Name
Earth Liberation Front
Animal Liberation Front
Anti-Police Extremist
Anti-White Extremist
Anarchist
Anarchist
Environmentalists
Black Hebrew Israelites
Anti-Republican Extremists
Pro-LGBT Rights Extremists
Pro-Choice Extremists
Animal Rights Extremists
Left-Wing Extremist
Revolutionary Cells-Animal
Liberation Brigade

N(Incidents)
15
13
8
7
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1

Islamic
Group Name
Jihadi-Inspired Extremists
Muslim Extremists
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
Iraqi Extremist
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

N(Incidents)
35
8
2
1
1

N(Total)

47

Other
Group Name
Unknown
Court Reform extremists
N(Total)

2

Students For Insurrection

1

Conspiracy Theorist Extremist

1
1
1
1
1

The Justice Department
Anti-Fascist Extremist

1
1

Ku Klux Klan

N(Total)

130
1
131

74

1
1
1
165

Notes : Table shows the perpetrator groups under that belong to each categories for all terrorist attacks that happened between 11/01/2003 to 12/31/2019
in the states that were matched with the court data.
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Table A.2. Nationalities of Applicants
Muslim Majority
Country
Indonesia
Albania
Egypt
Guinea
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Somalia
Iraq
Iran
Mauritania
Uzbekistan
Gambia
Mali
Syria
Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso
Sudan
Senegal
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Jordan
Turkey
Afghanistan
Kazakhstan
Yemen
Azerbaijan
Bos. & Herzegovin
Chad
Tajikistan
Niger
Turkmenistan
Algeria
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
N=

N(obs)
6171
4119
3582
3484
3401
3098
3033
2323
1716
1550
1340
1139
1132
1117
970
909
770
685
616
589
519
512
514
478
387
309
255
242
197
197
178
176
163
143
117
46,131

Latin American
Country
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Haiti
Colombia
Venezuela
Cuba
Nicaragua
Ecuador
Peru
Brazil
Dominican Rep.
Belize
Bolivia
Argentina
Chile

N(obs)
46159
36744
31741
30068
18621
13419
6045
3859
2953
2331
1711
1605
731
184
181
180
93

N=

196,625

Rest of The World
Country
India
Nepal
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Eritrea
Russia
Soviet Union
Armenia
Nigeria
Ukraine
Sri Lanka
Kenya
Ivory Coast
Yugoslavia
Jamaica
Myanmar
Romania
Ghana
Stateless
Congo
Mongolia
Moldavia
Togo
Zimbabwe
Liberia
Philippines
D. R. of Congo
Belarus
Uganda
Vietnam
Georgia
Guyana
Fiji
Bulgaria
Belarus
N=
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N(obs)
12641
5797
5361
4500
3947
3587
3003
2741
1896
1671
1662
1539
1542
1243
1224
1110
1036
1065
1015
992
903
892
857
808
785
707
664
643
644
617
612
540
507
466
457

Country
Rwanda
Burundi
Kosovo
Cambodia
Israel
Angola
Laos
Serbia
Macedonia
Trin. & Tobago
Tanzania
South Africa
Cen.l African Rep.
Poland
Lithuania
South Korea
Thailand
Benin
Zambia
Canada
Latvia

72,194

N(obs)
448
385
373
323
294
281
292
252
220
218
189
179
175
141
120
125
109
104
101
97
94

Country
China

N(obs)
70,898

N=

70,898

Figure A.1. Distribution of Decisions By the Nationality Category.
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Figure A.2. Distribution of Decisions For Latin American Countries.
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Figure A.3. Distribution of Decisions For Muslim Majority Countries.
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Figure A.4. Distribution of Decisions For Rest of the World.
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Appendix B. Supplementary Figures and Tables for Chapter 3

Figure B.1. Within Judge Distribution of Months With Hearing for Cases Remanded in
Favor of Immigrants By the Party of the Appellate Board.
Note: Each point on the Y-axis represent an individual judge. Shaded areas in the figures plot the duration
in which a judge makes asylum decisions in the sample. Red markers in the Left figure plots the months
in which each judge has had at least one hearing for a case remanded by a Democrat appeal board board
in favor of applicants and figure on the right plots the hearings for remanded cases in favor of immigrants
that were issued by Republican appeal boards.
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Figure B.2. Within Judge Distribution of Months With Hearing for Cases Remanded in
Favor of DHS By the Party of the Appellate Board.
Note: Each point on the Y-axis represent an individual judge. Shaded areas in the figures plot the duration
in which a judge makes asylum decisions in the sample. Red markers in the Left figure plots the months
in which each judge has had at least one hearing for a case remanded by a Democrat appeal board board
in favor of prosecutors and figure on the right plots the hearings for remanded cases in favor of prosecutors
that were issued by Republican appeal boards.

88

References
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2008). “terrorism and the world economy”. European
Economic Review , 52 , 1-27.
Akay, A., Bargain, O., & Elsayed, A. (2020). “global terror, well-being and political attitudes”. European Economic Review .
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2014). “a test of racial bias in capital sentencing”. American
Economic Review , 104 , 3397-3433.
Anker, D. E. (2011). “law of asylum in the united states: 2011 edition”. West Publishing.
Baker, S., & Kornhauser, L. (2015). “a theory of judicial deference”. Working Paper .
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